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Self-referential processing has been argued to hold a unique status in cognition. Self-referred 
information benefits from attentional biases which might facilitate its elaboration and retention. 
The present enquiry investigates self-referential biases on attention and memory, triggered by 
object ownership. In a first experiment, participants sorted shopping items as either belonging 
to self or other, guided by ownership cues; memory for the items was later measured with an 
old-new test. ERPs were recorded during both the sorting and test phases. More self-owned 
items were recognised, adding to the evidence that encoding items within an implicit self-
referential context facilitates their retention. An attentional bias was elicited by self-ownership 
cues, as measured by a larger P300 component, replicating previous findings (Turk et al., 2011). 
This difference in P300 persisted amongst subsequently recognised items, suggesting a 
contribution of the self-attentional bias to qualitative aspects of memory that were not 
behaviourally measured. Ownership modulated the late old-new effect, with a larger LPC 
observed for recognised self-owned items, possibly indexing the enhancement of recollection by 
self-reference. To investigate this possibility, a further ERP experiment was designed which 
employs a remember-know task during the memory phase of the shopping paradigm, to 
dissociate between recollection and familiarity-based recognition. The ERP-viability of this 
design was tested in a second behavioural experiment. More self-owned items were recollected, 
suggesting self-referential encoding enhances recollection specifically (van den Bos et al., 2010). 
Insufficient numbers of remember responses indicated the design would not be viable in an ERP 
experiment. Whether self-other differences seen in the ERPs in the present enquiry can be 
accounted for solely by differences in activity of regions involved in episodic memory retrieval, 
or also by activation of self-specific brain structures, remains to be further investigated by future 
enquiries. The potential application of self-reference to the enhancement of learning is 
discussed. 
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1 General Introduction  
1.1 Introducing the Concept of Self 
Philosophers have long discussed the concept of self, in trying to answer the metaphysical question 
of whether the self is real, and thus exists, or whether it is a matter of perception, something we 
perceive as real but, in fact, is just an illusion. As summarised by Northoff (2013), the French 
philosopher Descartes (1596-1650) thought the self to exist as a mental entity out of the body and 
outside experience, thus operating a body-mind distinction. In contrast, the Scottish philosopher 
Hume (1711-1766) described the self as a complex set of perceptions of events. According to the 
latter view, there is nothing else in reality other than the events that we perceive; in other words, 
the self is nothing but an illusion. The self as mere illusion is a popular stance also amongst current 
philosophers, who tend to side with Hume over Descartes (Northoff, 2013). If the self does not exist, 
how does one experience a self in the first place? As detailed by Northoff (2013, p.2), one view is 
that: 
“[One’s] own brain and body are represented as such in the neuronal activity of the brain. And such 
representation is the model of [one’s] self. The self-model is therefore nothing but an inner model as 
the integrated and summarised version of … [one’s] own brain and body’s information processing”. 
The self is here seen as merely a special form of representation. Therefore, the metaphysical 
discussion on the self as a philosophical concept is replaced by the discussion of how the self is 
represented in the brain. Northoff (2013) argues that, because such self-representation arises out of 
the integration and summarisation of neural processes, which cannot be directly observed, it must 
be supported by specific higher-order cognitive functions, for example attention and memory, 
amongst others. The implication of this view is that the self is no longer characterised as mental 
entity, but as cognitive construct, therefore allowing an empirical investigation of the cognitive 
processes that underlie its representation. The self ceases being a metaphysical matter for 
philosophers to discuss and becomes instead subject of empirical investigation for cognitive 
psychologists and neuroscientists (Northoff, 2013). 
The number of research enquiries into self-related cognitive processes has been flourishing at an 
astounding pace in the psychological sciences since the 1950’s (Klein, 2012). Given the difficulties in 
formulating an account of the self per se, enquiries usually focus on the neurological and cognitive 
mechanisms that are involved in generating the experience of self, – what Klein (2012, p.284) 
defines as the “epistemological self”. Science has advanced substantially in defining the cognitive 




the epistemological self is empirically testable, that is, it is accessible to third-person perspective. On 
the contrary, the “ontological self” (Klein, 2012, p.285), or the self of subjective experience, lacks the 
definitional adequacy for experimental enquiry.  
Klein (2012) further argues that many cognitive scientists rely on their readers’ familiarity with the 
concept of self in sidestepping the difficulty of defining what it is they are referring to when they use 
the term ‘self’, and that some may even fail to understand that the ontological self, or self as 
subjectivity, is not the object of their investigations. Furthermore, he argues that some 
contemporary philosophers, by pronouncing the self to be nothing more than an illusion, have made 
an attempt to exclude the ontological self from investigation, but “a simple question remains – to or 
for whom is the self an illusion?” (Klein, 2012, p.286). 
Following Klein’s admonition to cognitive scientists, it is here defined that the investigation of the 
ontological self, and its (or the lack of its) existence is not amongst the aims of the present enquiry. 
As such, every use of the term ‘self’ from here onward will refer to what Klein defines as 
epistemological self, or the self of knowledge and self-representation. The present enquiry aims to 
empirically investigate the self as a cognitive construct by means of observing its impact on higher 
cognitive functions such as attention and memory, as will be seen in the following sections. 
1.2 Self as a Cognitive Construct: Self-Referential Processing and the Self-Reference 
Effect 
Another way to operate Klein’s (2012) distinction between the ontological and the epistemological 
self, as described in the previous section, is by distinguishing the self as subject, or the ‘I’ of 
experience (i.e.; ontological), and the self as object, or the ‘Me’ of self-representation of contents 
(i.e.; epistemological). By one definition, self-referential processing “refers to a content that is 
already there and established while it is linked or referred to the self” (Northoff, 2016, p.204). 
Because of such dependence on contents, self-referential processing can only be defined within the 
concept of representation-based self (Northoff, 2016), that is, the epistemological self introduced in 
the previous section. 
Cognitive psychologists focusing on memory initially observed that information that is actively 
processed with reference to one’s self is better remembered than information processed in other 
ways. In their seminal work on ‘depth-of-processing’ (DOP), Craik and Tulving (1975) had already 
found that processing words for their semantic meaning makes them better remembered than 
words processed for their structural features. Extending this work, Rogers, Kuiper and Kirker (1977) 
found that evaluating trait adjectives for relevance to self (e.g., “Does the word ‘honest’ describe 




“Does the word ‘honest’ mean the same as ‘trustworthy’?”). Rogers and colleagues (1977) labelled 
this phenomenon the ‘self-reference effect’ (SRE) in memory.  
In explaining the SRE, two accounts have been proposed. On the one hand, Rogers and colleagues 
(1977) initially suggested that the self is a “superordinate schema that contains an abstracted record 
of a person’s past experience with personal data” (p.685), and that its cognitive structure holds 
special mnemonic abilities, resulting in enhanced memorability for information processed with 
reference to the self-schema. This account will be referred to from this point onward as the 
‘uniqueness account’ of self-reference. On the other hand, Klein and Loftus (1988) advanced the 
‘elaborative/organisational account’ that the self-referential memory advantage occurs as the self-
construct promotes both relational (i.e., elaborative) and item-specific (i.e., organisational) 
representation of information. Klein and Loftus (1988) argued that self-reference is different from 
other memory-enhancing tasks, in that self-reference promotes both elaboration and organisation 
at once, resulting in the observed memory advantage. However, according to their account, self-
reference is not unique; rather, the SRE is seen as an extension of the DOP effect. 
The SRE has been of interest to cognitive psychologists because of its potential as a way to 
investigate the impact of the self on memory. This has been investigated through the use of a variety 
of experimental tasks and populations. In early investigations of the effect, it was soon observed 
that comparisons of self-referential tasks with semantic tasks was confounded, as self-reference 
denotes a social entity, whereas semantic tasks do not, suggesting that the memory advantage may 
be an artifact of the task used for comparison (Symons & Johnson, 1997). In addressing this 
limitation, researchers started comparing memory following self-reference (SR) to that following 
other-reference (OR), that is, reference to a familiar other (e.g., “Does the word ‘honest’ describe 
the current president of the United States?”). Symons and Johnson (1997) carried out a first meta-
analytic review of the first two decades of SRE research, which primarily involved words as stimuli. 
They concluded that, overall, the hypothesis of an SRE was supported by evidence across the 
literature, with self-reference being more effective than comparison memory-enhancing tasks in 
facilitating memory in the studies which they reviewed, applying to a variety of contexts. Albeit the 
magnitude of the SRE was smaller for SR – OR comparisons, than in SR – semantic comparisons 
(mean weighted effect sizes d+ = 0.35 and d+ = 0.65 respectively, as reported in Symons & Johnson, 
1997, p.384), the SRE occurred consistently within both manipulations classes. 
On the basis of the elaborative/organisational account proposed by Klein and Loftus (1988), Symons 
and Johnson (1997) had hypothesised that the SRE would be smaller when the comparison task 




analysis revealed that the SRE was reduced, if not completely eliminated, when the other-referent 
used in the task was an intimate other. In contrast to this, familiarity of the other-referent did not 
predict the magnitude of the effect. They argued this occurs as the rating of a highly intimate other 
(e.g., one’s mother) is a frequently occurring, thus well-practiced, task. Moreover, the SRE should 
decrease as the intimacy of the other increases, because rating a highly intimate other involves 
relational processing in which a highly organised memory domain is referenced, and item-specific 
processing that involves increasing degrees of elaboration as one’s knowledge of the other-referent 
target increases. Following this, they recommended that future studies should consider intimacy of 
the other-referent as different from high familiarity. 
Following their review of the evidence, Symons and Johnson (1997) adopted Klein and Loftus’s 
(1988) perspective that self-reference, although not necessary, is sufficient to enhance memory. 
However, they further suggested that its major benefit lies not in invoking organisational and 
elaborative processing per se but instead in creating matching between encoding and retrieval 
conditions, where encoding is the initial processing of information, and retrieval is its later 
recognition or recall. Thus, they argued that it is this encoding-retrieval matching that distinguishes 
self-reference from other kinds of memory enhancement techniques. Further to this, they argued 
that the uniqueness of self-reference as a process is also due to the practice it receives every day, as 
one processes certain kinds of information with reference to oneself. In favour of this point is the 
observation that self-reference is most effective in facilitating memory for certain kinds of stimuli, 
such as trait adjectives, which are commonly organised and elaborated through reference to self. 
1.2.1  Investigating Self-Referential Processing with Neuroimaging 
The evaluation of the two competing theories of the uniqueness account (Rogers et al., 1977), and 
the elaborative/organisational account (Klein and Loftus, 1988), introduced in the previous section, 
is challenging by using merely behavioural measures. The advent of neuroimaging techniques 
further informed the understanding of self-referential processing and its supporting neural systems. 
Craik and colleagues (1999) were the first to investigate self-reference with positron emission 
tomography (PET). It had been previously documented that memory encoding processes activate left 
prefrontal areas, while episodic memory retrieval predominantly involves right prefrontal areas 
(Nyberg, Cabeza & Tulving, 1996). Following James’s (1890) point that, “for a mental event to be 
experienced as a personal memory, the imagined event must … be referred to the past and … be 
associated with feelings of self” (p.650), Craik and colleagues (1999) wanted to investigate the role 
of self in memory retrieval, specifically whether the association of retrieval with activation of right 




Participants completed a trait-adjective task in the PET scanner, in which they rated personality trait 
adjectives on how well they described themselves or a familiar other, with the addition of two 
control conditions involving semantic and syllabic judgements. Their behavioural results showed a 
self-reference effect, whereby participants remembered more adjectives rated in relation to 
themselves, versus the familiar other, and the control conditions. PET data during the encoding of 
adjectives showed left prefrontal activations for the self-related condition, which were similar to 
those for the other-related condition and the semantic control condition, suggesting that part of 
self-concept is represented in a similar form to other semantic knowledge. In contrast, the PET data 
during retrieval showed frontal activations specific to the self-related condition, compared to the 
other-related and the control conditions. Self-related processing predominantly activated regions in 
the right frontal lobe. Craik and colleagues (1999) interpreted their findings as evidence that 
activation of the self-concept is necessary for episodic retrieval, as supported by neural activation in 
the right frontal lobe, where the self-concept might be, at least partially, represented. They also 
acknowledged an alternative explanation, whereby self-related judgements necessarily involve 
retrieval of episodic instances; however, evidence that amnesic patients retain the abilities for self-
assessments goes against this alternative explanation (e.g., Klein, Loftus & Kihlstrom, 1996). 
Wanting to further investigate whether self-referential processing holds a unique status in the brain, 
Kelley and colleagues (2002) used event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), 
whilst participants made judgements on trait adjectives, as in Craik and colleagues’ (1999) PET study. 
Previous functional imaging studies had located areas in the left frontal cortex that showed larger 
activation for elaborative semantic encoding of words, compared to non-semantic, surface-based 
encoding of words (Buckner, Kelley & Petersen, 1999). Kelley and colleagues (2002) hypothesised 
that, if the SRE is an extension of ordinary semantic memory processes, as argued by Klein and 
Loftus (1988), then they would expect to find larger activation for self-relevant judgements in those 
left frontal areas found to be specifically involved in semantic encoding. Otherwise, if the SRE results 
from the uniqueness of the self as cognitive construct (Rogers et al., 1977), then they should be able 
to observe selective engagement of other brain regions during self-relevant judgements. 
Behavioural results showed a self-reference effect, with more adjectives remembered when judged 
for self-relevance, than for other-relevance. The left inferior frontal cortex and the anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC) were selectively activated during semantic judgements versus structural judgements. 
However, self-related judgements did not result in a larger activation of left frontal regions. This 
result provides evidence against the elaborative/organisational hypothesis that the SRE is an 
extension of the DOP (Klein & Loftus, 1988). Further to this, selective activation of the medial 




colleagues’ (1999) findings. Moreover, unlike Craik and colleagues who used a blocked-design 
paradigm, whereby a number of same-type trials are presented in succession, in Kelley and 
colleagues’ (2002) paradigm trial types were intermixed randomly, thus allowing an examination of 
item-related activity in isolation (rather than in a block). As such, their results were the first to 
directly associate activity in the MPFC to self-relevant judgements. Kelley and colleagues (2002) 
concluded that their study provided further functional imaging evidence for the uniqueness account 
of self-referential processing, and suggested the MPFC as a neural substrate for the SRE in memory. 
In the following section, more neuroimaging evidence will be discussed, with the aim to provide an 
overview of the neural systems supporting self-referential processing. 
1.3 Neural Systems supporting Self-Referential Processing 
1.3.1  Cortical Midline Structures and the Rest-Self Overlap 
Northoff and colleagues (2006) conducted a meta-analysis of 27 PET and fMRI studies on self-related 
tasks employing a variety of stimuli, such as trait adjectives, memories, emotions and movements, 
all published in the early 2000’s. Their aim was to investigate whether activation observed in a set of 
structures known as cortical midline structures (CMS; see Figure 1.1) when processing self-related 
material, is specific to self-referential processing, or can be accounted for by other 
sensory/perceptual processes supporting the tasks used, as hypothesised in a critical review by 
Gillihan and Farah (2005). Their findings revealed a set of regions within the extended CMS which 
are activated during self-referential processing. This activation occurred independently of sensory 
modality, and such sensory independence could be observed in all domains. This led Northoff and 
colleagues (2006) to advance that neural processing in CMS might be characterised by 
“supramodality” (p.449), that is, independence from the modality of the task used. They further 
justified their claim by noting how CMS receive afferent connections from all exteroceptive sensory 
modalities (olfactory, gustatory, somatosensory, auditory, visual). In addition, they also noted that 
CMS are densely connected to cortical and subcortical regions (insula and brain stem regions) 
processing interoceptive sensory signals. Given said connections to sensory regions, and the 
abovementioned supramodality, Northoff and colleagues (2006) suggested that the CMS “might 
provide the anatomical ground for directly assessing the different sensory stimuli according to their 
degree of self-referentiality” (p.449); however, they also noted that the mechanisms by which this 
occurs are unclear and need further investigation. Nevertheless, their meta-analysis provides strong 





Figure 1.1 Schematic illustration of cortical midline structures (CMS). The regions referred to as CMS include: 
MOPFC = medial orbital prefrontal cortex; VMPFC = ventromedial prefrontal cortex; PACC = perigenual 
anterior cingulate cortex; SACC = supragenual anterior cingulate cortex; DMPFC = dorsomedial prefrontal 
cortex; MPC = medial parietal cortex; PCC = posterior cingulate cortex; RSC = retrosplenial cortex. Reproduced 
from Northoff et al. (2006, p.442). 
 
CMS are a major component of the ‘default mode network’ (DMN), a brain system containing “a set 
of interacting brain areas that are tightly functionally connected and distinct from other systems 
within the brain” (Buckner, Andrews-Hanna & Schacter, 2008, pp.4-5). This network of brain areas 
was first defined in its characteristics by Gusnard, Raichle and colleagues in a series of articles 
(Gusnard & Raichle, 2001; Gusnard, Akbudak, Shulman & Raichle, 2001; Raichle et al., 2001). The 
DMN includes regions along the anterior and posterior midline, the lateral parietal cortex, prefrontal 
cortex, and the medial temporal lobe. What brought attention to this set of regions was their 
increased levels of activation during undirected, baseline mental states, as opposed to deactivation 
in most goal-directed tasks; its discovery was, in fact, entirely accidental (Buckner et al., 2008). The 
defining feature of the DMN, that is, its increased activity at rest, has proved challenging for defining 
its function. Buckner and colleagues (2008) have suggested that the DMN might support internal 
thinking that is detached from the external environment, such as when constructing mental 
simulations both in the past and in the future, or alternatively, that it might support “exploratory 
monitoring of the external environment, when focused attention is relaxed” (p.19). Moreover, the 
anatomy of the DMN can also be informative towards its possible function. For instance, primary 
sensory or motor areas are not included in the DMN. On the contrary, the DMN includes areas 
associated with memory (Bucker et al., 2008). 
Of particular interest to the present enquiry, self-referential tasks have been found to activate 
certain components of the DMN, the MPFC in particular (Gusnard et al., 2001). Northoff, Qin and 




stimulus-induced activity in sensory cortices and named this a ‘rest-stimulus interaction’. Qin and 
Northoff (2011) then hypothesised that self-related stimuli are characterised by a unique rest-
stimulus interaction. With the aim of further investigating the relationship between activity in 
regions involved in self-referential processing, and resting-state activity in the DMN, they carried out 
a quantitative meta-analysis including 87 fMRI and PET studies. Results showed an overlap between 
self-referential and resting-state activity in the perigenual anterior cingulate cortex (PACC), which 
was specifically active during processing of self-related stimuli. Instead, other midline regions part of 
the DMN, the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), were not 
characterised by self-specificity, as they also activated during processing of non-self-related, control 
stimuli. 
Qin and Northoff’s (2011) meta-analysis provided further evidence for a ‘rest-self overlap’ in the 
anterior parts of the DMN (Figure 1.2). Besides this, it also identified the PACC as a region of the 
cortex which might play a key role in the interaction between self-related activity and resting state 
activity. The finding of the rest-self overlap led Northoff (2016) to question the tradition to consider 
the self as a higher-order cognitive function, associated with higher-order cognitive processes such 
as memory. Self-relatedness has, in fact, been associated with basic cognitive functions, such as 
perception, action, reward and emotion; moreover, as seen in previous paragraphs, it is associated 
with the resting state activity of the brain. These findings are a challenge to the characterisation of 
self as a higher-order cognitive function. Instead, Northoff postulates, “the self may be the most 
fundamental function of the brain and its intrinsic or spontaneous activity” (2006, p.204). 
 
Figure 1.2 Neural overlap between default-mode network (DMN) resting-state activity and self-related 
processing activity. PACC = perigenual anterior cingulate cortex; PCC = posterior cingulate cortex. Reproduced 





1.3.2 Self-Referential Biases on Attention and Memory: A Self-Relevance System? 
A striking example of how self-relatedness can be computed pre-attentively is the ‘own name 
effect’. Moray (1959) found that, during a dichotic listening procedure, participants detected their 
own names when presented in the unattended channel, and also recalled more stimuli in the 
unattended channel, if presented following their own name, compared with other people’s names. 
The attention-capturing power of one’s own name (as of one’s own face) suggests a bias for 
attending to self-related stimuli. One possible explanation for this effect, is that own name 
representations have a lower threshold for activation. All unattended stimuli might be processed 
pre-attentively to an extent, however, the lower threshold for one’s own name would result in the 
self-related stimuli attracting attention (Treisman, 1960). 
Functional neuroimaging evidence that self-referential processing may be unique, as seen in the 
previous section, speaks against the hypothesis initially advanced by Klein and Loftus (1988) that the 
self-reference effect results from the enhanced elaboration and organisation occurring during the 
processing of self-referenced material, in a way similar to depth-of-processing effects. D. J. Turk, 
Cunningham and Macrae (2008) hypothesised that, if self-referential processing is indeed 
functionally distinct from other types of processing, the SRE might be found in conditions where the 
explicit, evaluative judgement of self-relevant information is not necessary. In order to investigate 
their hypothesis, they modified the standard trait-evaluation task, to better simulate the undirected 
contexts in which self interacts with stimuli in the environment. As previous research showed that 
attention is automatically directed towards self-relevant stimuli such as one’s name (Gray, Ambady, 
Lowenthal & Deldin, 2004) or one’s face (Sui, Zhu & Han, 2006), D. J. Turk and colleagues (2008) 
utilised names and faces to create a context that would activate the self-construct in a non-
evaluative, incidental manner. In this implicit task, participants reported whether trait adjectives 
appeared above or below self-referent and other-referent cues (one’s own versus another’s name or 
face). They also included an explicit task involving a standard self-referential trait-adjective paradigm 
for comparison (e.g., Kelley et al., 2002). 
D. J. Turk and colleagues (2008) found that more adjectives presented along with self-reference cues 
were remembered, compared to other-referent cues, in both explicit and implicit conditions, albeit 
the magnitude of the memory bias was larger in the explicit encoding condition. Their findings speak 
against previous claims that explicit elaboration is needed to elicit the self-reference effect (Keenan, 
Golding & Brown, 2002), as the mere presence of self-cues during the encoding of information 
proved sufficient to result in a memory enhancement. D. J. Turk and colleagues (2008) offered a 
potential explanation for the memory enhancement observed, in that self-referred material is 




referential processing is functionally distinct from other-referential processing (Kelley et al., 2002; 
Northoff et al., 2006). 
In wanting to investigate whether self-biases modulate pre-attentive processes, or whether they are 
dependent on the availability of attentional resources, Humphreys and Sui (2016) reviewed evidence 
on attentional self-biases and proposed a framework for how self and attention interact, termed the 
Self-Attention Network (SAN), which includes three main processing nodes: (a) a top-down 
attentional control network, (b) a self-representation node, and (c) a region involved in bottom-up 
orienting of attention. According to their model, the nodes interact to determine the brain’s 
response to self-related stimuli; such interactions are both excitatory and inhibitory in nature (as 
further described in Figure 1.3). 
Humphreys and Sui’s (2016) model importantly highlights a top-down moderation of bottom-up 
driven self-related activity. This is important as attentional biases created by high self-relevance can 
sometimes be disruptive to optimal cognitive functioning, for example, in traumatic experiences 
(Conway, Pothos & D. J. Turk, 2016). Conversely, there are circumstances in which allocating 
attention to self-relevant information is beneficial, for instance, to enhance subsequent memory for 
such information (Conway, 2005). Humphreys and Sui (2016) proposed that the excitatory 
connections from the top-down attentional control network can elicit self-attentional bias. 
 
Figure 1.3 The Self-Attention Network (SAN) and its three main processing nodes: (1) a general purpose top-
down attentional control network, including the intra-parietal sulcus (IPS) and the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (DLPFC); (2) a self-representation node, housed in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC); and (3) a 
region involved in bottom-up orienting of attention, in the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS). Black 
arrows indicate excitatory connections. Grey arrows indicate inhibitory connections. Dotted arrows highlight 





In a commentary to Humphreys and Sui’s paper, Conway and colleagues (2016) further proposed 
that the SAN may be “part of a larger self-regulatory system … [termed] the Self-Relevance System 
(SRS), of which the ‘core’ or default network is a major part” (p.20). When attention is unfocused, 
anterior and posterior networks in the DMN are active. These networks also activate whilst 
remembering the past and imagining the future (Addis, Wong & Schacter, 2007). In other words, 
when the brain is ‘at rest’, the outputs of remembering and imagining might be what the SAN 
attends to. Conway and colleagues (2016) suggested that inhibiting and facilitating such outputs is 
what shapes attentional biases and behaviour. 
In yet another commentary to Humphreys and Sui (2016), Northoff (2016) attempted to further 
define the underlying neural mechanisms of self-referential processing by advancing a hypothesis for 
how self-related attentional biases occur. Again, drawing from the evidence of a neural rest-self 
overlap and rest-stimulus interaction, as seen above, he advanced that “a special form of rest-
stimulus interaction [is required] between resting state and self-related stimuli to account for the 
qualitative and automatic features of self-reference” (Northoff, 2016, p.18). 
In an EEG study by Bai and colleagues (2015), pre-stimulus alpha-power was found to predict the 
degree of self-reference attributed to pictorial stimuli. From this result, taken together with other 
evidence, Northoff (2016) concluded that the resting state activity has a significant impact on 
subsequent stimulus-induced activity, and on the extent to which a stimulus is perceived as self-
related. Moreover, he argues that this rest-stimulus interaction does not only occur within the CMS 
as part of the DMN, instead, it may also involve other networks. A “certain degree of self-specificity” 
(Northoff, 2016, p.19) might be encoded in the balance of the resting state activity of such extended 
CMS network. It is the degree of such self-specific organisation, according to Northoff (2016), that 
might define how the resting state reacts to stimuli. A higher degree of self-specific organisation 
could result into a higher degree of self-specificity attributed to external stimuli, which itself would 
result into higher automatic self-reference effects, as supported by the SAN advanced by Humphreys 
and Sui (2016). However, it has to be noted that Northoff’s (2016) argument is speculative and 
needs further investigation. 
Although a detailed investigation of the specific neural networks that mediate self-attentional biases 
is beyond the scope of the present dissertation, a review of these mechanisms is central for an 
understanding of the operation of self in cognition. In a further commentary, Cunningham (2016) 
links Humphreys and Sui’s SAN to the self-referential memory advantage, by considering its function. 
Cunningham and colleagues previously argued that ensuring that self-relevant information is not lost 




J. Turk, 2013). Here she argues that the SAN may serve this function, supporting the self-reference 
effect. As previously discussed, this memory advantage is observed even when self-association at 
encoding is incidental (D. J. Turk et al., 2008). Cunningham (2016) further justifies her claim by 
observing that self-relevance is perpetually pertinent to present goals; thus, the SAN functions to 
direct attention towards self-cues, and the encoding of information mediated by such attentional 
bias results in memories which are characteristically episodic in nature, enriched by recollection of 
detail from the encoding context (Conway & Dewhurst, 1995). Yet, self-relevance can also inhibit the 
encoding of memory detail, for instance, in traumatic experiences (Conway, Meares & Standart, 
2004). In this case, the inhibitory control of self-attentional bias is also critical, as top-down 
modulation of self-attentional biases may enable the encoding of memory details (Conway et al., 
2016). 
In conclusion, the SAN framework proposed by Humphreys and Sui (2016), might be able to account 
for both top-down and bottom-up modulation of self-attentional biases within a larger self-
regulatory system as proposed by Conway and colleagues (2016), perhaps serving the ecological 
function of ensuring that self-relevant information is remembered. 
 
 
1.4 The Extended Self: Self-Reference through Ownership 
A man’s Self is the sum total of all that he CAN call his, not only his body and 
psychic powers, but his clothes and his house, his wife and children, his ancestors 
and friends, his reputation and works, his lands, and yacht and bank-account. 
(James, 1980, p.291) 
The concept of epistemological self initially introduced at the beginning of this chapter can be 
‘extended’ to include, besides one’s body and mind, also one’s possessions (Belk, 1988). 
Psychological ownership might offer an alternative way of studying the self and its impact on 
cognition, through its association with objects. As D. J. Turk and colleagues put it, “object ownership 
represents the mental synthesis of object and self in time” (D. J. Turk, van Bussel, Waiter & Macrae, 
2011, p.3657). Owned objects seem to generally benefit from a special processing status because of 
their association with self. For instance, objects arbitrarily assigned to oneself are filled with more 
positive characteristics (the ‘mere ownership’ effect; Beggan, 1992) and are judged as more 
economically valuable (the ‘endowment’ effect; Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, 1991), than identical 




As previously discussed, self-relevant stimuli benefit from an attentional bias that might result in 
enhanced memory for self-relevant material. Cunningham, Turk, Macdonald and Macrae (2008) 
therefore predicted that object ownership would impact not only on evaluative processing, but also 
on the encoding and storage of owned-object representations in memory. They developed a new 
paradigm to investigate the self-reference effect (Rogers et al., 1977; Symons & Johnson, 1997) 
through ownership. In the original ‘shopping paradigm’, participants and a confederate were each 
assigned a shopping basket, either red or blue, and instructed to imagine they had each won a 
selection of shopping items available for purchase in a large supermarket (such as food, clothes and 
electricals). The items were represented by picture cards marked with either a red or blue colour 
cue. The participants sorted the items in the correct basket, guided by the colour cues. Their 
memory for the items was later tested with a surprise memory test. 
In Cunningham and colleagues’ (2008) study, participants remembered more items that were 
assigned to themselves, than to the confederate participant (with mean proportions of remembered 
items of .65 and .59 respectively). The ownership effect emerged irrespective of who moved the 
picture cards into the correct basket. Cunningham and colleagues’ (2008) findings thus further 
extended the SRE beyond the standard trait-rating paradigm, demonstrating that the benefits of 
self-referential encoding can apply to a wider variety of tasks. Ownership in the shopping paradigm 
is hypothetical, as participants do not take the objects home. Despite this, this transient ownership 
context is sufficient to impact on cognition in a significant way, causing a memory advantage for self-
owned objects of comparable size to that seen in Turk et al. (2008)..  
Cunningham and colleagues (2008) concluded from their findings that association between self and 
objects through ownership might determine their memorability, in a similar way to the association 
of trait adjectives to self through implicit self-referential encoding as seen in Turk et al. (2008). . As 
to how this impact of ownership on cognition arises, they hypothesised that owned objects might 
preferentially catch visual attention, or trigger direction of attentional resources toward their 
encoding or retrieval. In addition, reward mechanisms might also play a part in causing the 
ownership self-reference effect, as acquiring ownership of objects might activate reward circuits in 
the brain, thus influencing their processing. Neuroimaging studies have explored these hypotheses 
by investigating the neural basis of the ownership self-reference effect, as discussed in the next 
section. 
1.4.1 The Neural Basis of the Ownership Self-Reference Effect and The Present Enquiry 
D. J. Turk and colleagues (D. J. Turk, van Bussel, Brebner et al., 2011; D. J. Turk, van Bussel, Waiter & 




self-referential processing to the ownership self-reference effect. In a first neuroimaging study 
participants were scanned using fMRI whilst they completed the shopping paradigm, and their 
memory for the shopping items was subsequently tested (D. J. Turk, van Bussel, Waiter & Macrae, 
2011). Amongst CMS identified by Northoff et al.’s (2006) meta-analysis, ventromedial areas are 
thought to support the evaluation of stimuli with reference to self, whereas posterior areas, given 
their connections to the hippocampus, might support the autobiographical self. D. J. Turk and 
colleagues suggested that, in the case of the trait-rating paradigm (e.g., Kelley et al., 2002), activity 
in both these areas of the CMS might support the evaluation of stimuli with reference to the self. 
They hypothesised that in the case of object ownership, as acquiring an object can potentially be a 
rewarding experience, areas that are associated with reward processing might also be activated.  
Indeed, D. J. Turk and colleagues (D. J. Turk, van Bussel, Waiter & Macrae, 2011, p. 3664) identified 
an “ownership network” of areas in which activity was larger for self-owned than other-owned 
objects. This network included posterior dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dMPFC) extending ventrally 
to caudal anterior cingulate cortex (cACC), anterior inferior parietal cortex, including the 
supramarginal and postcentral gyri, the left insula, and right superior temporal gyrus. Furthermore, 
they looked at how activity in the network related to the self-memory bias, and found a positive 
correlation for some of the areas included in this network. These areas showed temporal patterns of 
activation by which first, there was activation in dorsomedial superior frontal gyrus (SFG; part of the 
dMPFC) and cACC, areas known to modulate attention to salient stimuli; then, followed by activity in 
anterior inferior parietal cortex and insular cortex, implicated in attention for action, and reward 
signalling, respectively. The areas of the network found to activate for the processing of self-owned 
objects partially overlapped with CMS, particularly dMPFC and ACC structures (Figure 1.4). 
However, some other areas identified in previous studies (e.g., Kelley et al., 2002) as associated with 
self-referential processing, such as areas within the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vMPFC) and 
posterior cingulate, showed larger activity for other-owned objects instead. D. J. Turk and colleagues 
(D. J. Turk, van Bussel, Waiter & Macrae, 2011) interpreted this controversial finding considering that 
resting state activity in these areas decreases when required to engage in specified cognitive tasks 
(Gusnard & Raichle, 2001). These findings showed a potential network of brain regions that support 







Figure 1.4 Activation of CMS regions during the processing of self-owned objects in D. J. Turk et al. (2011). 
Highlighted in yellow, areas of CMS which predicted the self-memory bias. Reproduced from D. J. Turk, 
van Bussel, Waiter & Macrae (2011, p.3663). 
 
As the own-name effect (Moray, 1959) suggests, attention to self-relevant information is automatic. 
An event-related potential (ERP) study by Gray and colleagues (2004) showed the first evidence that 
self-relevant words such as one’s own name or hometown elicit the P300 component, known as an 
index of attention. This finding motivated D. J. Turk and colleagues’ (D. J. Turk, van Bussel, Brebner 
et al., 2011) ERP study, in which they investigated attentional biases triggered by object ownership. 
Specifically, they wanted to determine whether the enhanced attentional processing of self-relevant 
stimuli, as observed in Gray and colleagues’ study, could be initiated online at the time of gaining 
ownership of an object which one has no personal history with (unlike one’s own name or 
hometown), even if the ownership status is temporary and fictitious. In order to achieve high 
temporal accuracy in their investigation, they used an ERP version of the shopping paradigm 
(Cunningham et al., 2008). 
D. J. Turk, van Bussel, Brebner and others (2011) found that the P300 component was present for 
both self-cues and other-cues; however, it was larger for self-cues, suggesting that the attentional 
bias directed to self-owned stimuli is triggered online at the time of gaining the objects. 
Furthermore, in a second part of the same study, they also investigated perceptual attention 
directed to self-owned objects, as measured via the earlier P1 ERP component, known to be 
associated with sensory-evoked visual activity (e.g., Handy, Soltani & Mangun, 2001). They did so by 
adapting their paradigm to include a small, task-irrelevant visual distractor to appear before and 
after the presentation of the ownership cue. Their data showed a decrease in the P1 component for 
self-owned trials, but only after the ownership cues, to reflect a narrowing of attention to self-
owned objects and, therefore, a decrease in sensory-evoked attention capture towards distractors, 




From these results, D. J. Turk, van Bussel, Brebner and others (2011) concluded that, when one 
comes into ownership of an object, not only the owned object gets afforded a greater level of higher 
cognitive processing, but attention also becomes focused on that object at a perceptual level. As the 
paradigm they used did not include a memory test after the shopping task, it remains unclear how 
the perceptual and attentional effects they observed might predict the memory bias associated with 
object ownership previously reported (e.g., Cunningham et al., 2008). With the view of advancing 
knowledge on how self impacts on cognition overall, the present enquiry aims to investigate self-
referential attentional biases, using object ownership to trigger self-reference and, in addition, to 





2  Experiment 1 
2.1 Introduction to Experiment 1  
2.1.1 Self-referential attentional and memory biases 
The attention-grabbing power of our own names (Moray, 1959) suggests a bias for attending to self-
relevant stimuli, yet how this self-bias relates to attention needs further defining; specifically, 
whether self-bias modulates pre-attentive processes, or it depends on attentional resources being 
available. In Humphreys and Sui’s (2016) Self-Attention-Network (SAN), self-bias is characterised 
both by bottom-up modulation of attention and top-down attentional control. Conway and 
colleagues (2016) advanced that the SAN may be a sub-system of a Self-Relevance System (SRS), 
which also comprises the default mode network (for an extended introduction to these models, see 
1.3.2). 
A bias for attending to self-relevant information in the environment can also be considered in its 
adaptive function. Cunningham (2016) suggested that the SAN might function to ensure that 
information that is relevant to the self is attended to and better remembered; attentional biases 
might support the retrieval of self-relevant information through its preferential encoding. The self-
reference effect (SRE), the memory advantage associated with self-relevant information, has been 
well-documented in the literature (Symons and Johnson, 1997; introduced in 1.2). This is the finding 
that memory for information encoded in a self-relevant context is enhanced, when compared to 
information encoded in a non-self-relevant context. This effect is also found when self-reference is 
incidental and non-directive, such as when to-be-remembered stimuli are presented simultaneously 
with a self-cue (D. J. Turk et al., 2008).  
Another characteristic of the self-memory advantage is that it has been found to be specific to 
episodic recollection. Tulving (1985) was the first to identify ‘remembering’ and ‘knowing’ as ways of 
differentiating, respectively, the episodic and semantic components of memory, and developed the 
remember-know (R-K) task. This is a variant of the old-new test memory test, in which participants 
judge items on whether they have been previously presented in the experiment (‘old’), or they are 
novel (‘new’). In the R-K task, after making an ‘old’ judgement, participants are asked to make a 
further judgement on whether they ‘remember’ seeing the item, that is, they recollect specific 
details of the item’s previous presentation, or they simply ‘know’ that the item was presented 
before, based on feelings of strong familiarity with the item, without recollecting any specific details. 
Using a R-K task, Conway and Dewhurst (1995), found that the memory advantage for self-related 




episodic recollection, but not those that were recognised on the basis of familiarity. This finding led 
Conway and Dewhurst (1995) to suggest that self-referential encoding aids the formation of rich, 
elaborate representations in memory. Ensuring that information of relevance to self is remembered 
has been hypothesised as an important ecological function of these self-referential biases 
(Cunningham et al., 2013). Ultimately, as Cunningham (2016) suggested, defining the relationship 
between the aforementioned attentional biases and memory is essential for a comprehensive 
understanding of the self as a cognitive construct. 
2.1.2 The role of attention in the ownership self-reference effect 
The concept of self can be extended to include one’s possessions (Belk, 1988); we are preoccupied 
with what we own (see 1.4 for an introduction to the ownership self-reference effect). Following 
Cunningham and colleagues’ (2008) findings of the SRE using the shopping paradigm, the ownership 
self-reference effect was further investigated by van den Bos, Cunningham, Conway and Turk (2010) 
using a modified version of such paradigm. They wanted to determine whether, in line with Conway 
and Dewhurst (1995)’s hypothesis that the self-reference advantage is specific to episodic 
recollection, the effect would only be present amongst recollected items. They included a R-K task 
after the shopping task and predicted that a memory advantage would still occur for self-owned, 
compared to other-owned items, yet this advantage would only be limited to recognition 
judgements accompanied by recollective experience. Indeed, they found that the ownership effect 
was present only amongst ‘remember’, but not ‘know’, responses, suggesting that the memory 
advantage elicited by ownership is specific to recollection. However, this study employed full-
attention conditions, lacking an investigation of the relationship between the availability of 
attentional resources and such memory advantage. 
In order to investigate the role of attention at encoding and its relationship to the subsequent 
memory advantage, D. J. Turk and colleagues (2013) developed a divided attention (DA) version of 
the shopping task. Specifically, they wanted to investigate whether the memory advantage that is 
elicited by ownership depends on the attentional resources recruited by self-ownership cues. The 
elaboration/organisation account of the SRE (Klein & Loftus, 1988), explains the memory advantage 
associated with self-reference in light of the enhanced elaboration and organisation of information 
brought by applying self-knowledge while one is encoding new information. In contrast, D. J. Turk 
and colleagues (2013) argued that this account is difficult to reconcile with the finding that the self-
reference effect is also persistent when self-reference is non-evaluative, that is, when the paradigm 
used does not require explicit evaluation of information with reference to self-knowledge, such as in 
the standard trait-adjective paradigm. D. J. Turk and colleagues (2013) hypothesised that such 




self-relevant information, in that items processed as self-relevant, such as a self-owned object, 
benefit from the automatic recruitment of attentional resources, resulting in elaborate memory 
representations. 
Following the above reasoning, D. J. Turk and colleagues (2013) hypothesised that if the memory 
advantage for self-owned items is supported by elaborative encoding that is dependent on the 
availability of attentional resources, then divided attention should reduce or eliminate the 
ownership self-reference effect. This is because decreasing the availability of attentional resources 
would result in the selective impairment of self-referential processing of information, resulting in 
lower memory for self-owned items. Moreover, they also used the R-K task as a memory test, and 
further hypothesised that the said decrease would only occur for the recollection component of 
memory. Indeed, they found that self-other differences in recollection were eliminated under 
divided attention conditions, with a decrease in the proportion of self-owned items recollected, yet 
this did not occur amongst items recognised based on familiarity. 
D. J. Turk and colleagues (2013) concluded that the elaborative self-referential encoding triggered by 
ownership is attentionally demanding, as the availability of attentional resources proved critical for 
the self-memory enhancement and, specifically, for the successful retention of episodic detail. As 
dividing attention did not affect memory for other-owned items, they suggested that elaboration of 
other-owned items occurs to a lessened extent, even when attentional resources are fully available 
(D. J. Turk et al., 2013). Their results link well into the model of SAN proposed by Humphreys and Sui 
(2016), whereby a top-down attentional control mechanism might determine self-referential 
attentional biases. Indeed, if attentional resources are depleted, this top-down mechanism might 
not be activated. The results of this study by Turk and colleagues (2013) speak to the important role 
of attentional mechanisms in supporting self-referential attentional biases in a self-relevance system 
(SRS; Conway et al., 2016). 
Besides behavioural studies, the neural mechanisms underlying self-referential processing have also 
been investigated (introduced in 1.3). A meta-analysis of brain imaging studies (Northoff et al., 2006) 
revealed the involvement of a particular set of regions, the cortical midline structures (CMS), when 
processing stimuli with self-reference. This involvement was observed across domains, leading to the 
suggestion of self-specificity as a cognitive function supported by the aforementioned structures in 
the brain, and self-referential processing being central to what the self is (Northoff et al., 2006). 
Previous studies by D. J. Turk and colleagues investigated the neural mechanisms underpinning the 
ownership effect with the use of brain imaging techniques (D. J. Turk, van Bussel, Brebner, et al., 




In an fMRI study using the shopping paradigm, D. J. Turk, van Bussel, Waiter and Macrae (2011) 
identified early activity in the caudal anterior cingulate cortex (cACC), known for modulating 
attention to salient objects, when processing self-owned items. Their analysis revealed a significant 
positive relationship between brain activation in this area, and subsequent self-memory bias. In an 
ERP version of the shopping paradigm, D. J. Turk, van Bussel, Brebner and colleagues (2011) found 
spatial attention to narrow to the location of self-owned items, as denoted by an increased P1 visual 
component. Moreover, there was an increase in attentional processing triggered by self-ownership 
cues, as measured via the P300 component (Polich, 2011). A significant difference in the P300 
component was found between ownership conditions, with self-owned items eliciting a larger, more 
positive P300, than other-owned items (a ‘P300 effect’). Previous research has found that P300 
indexes attention to self-relevant stimuli (Gray et al., 2004). Both studies by D. J. Turk and colleagues 
provided further indication that self-referential processing through ownership is dependent upon 
attentional and perceptual processes. 
2.1.3 The present investigation 
2.1.3.1 The P300 Effect and Subsequent Memory 
ERP-technique provides an excellent covert method of investigation of attention and memory 
processes; however, the ERP study by D. J. Turk, van Bussel, Brebner and colleagues (2011) did not 
include a memory test, thus lacking insight into the influence of self-referential attentional bias, 
indexed by the P300 effect, on later memory performance. A way to investigate this would be to 
compare ERPs at encoding for items that are subsequently recognised at test (‘subsequent hits’) and 
those for items that are not (‘subsequent misses’). The differences between these ERPs are termed 
‘subsequent memory effects’ (e.g., Paller & Wagner, 2002). An assumption of this type of ERP 
studies of memory encoding is that differences observed between neural activity elicited by studied 
items at encoding, which subsequently attract either correct or incorrect memory judgements, are 
correlates of processes involved in successful memory formation (Wilding & Ranganath, 2011). 
In the particular case of the shopping paradigm, it would be of interest to explore whether a self-
other difference in the P300 component, or the ‘P300 effect’, persisted amongst subsequent hits, 
but not amongst misses; that is, the P300 effect would persist even amongst items that are 
subsequently remembered. This would signify that the P300 effect observed is a correlate of 
encoding processes that contribute to memory qualitatively, beyond only attracting a 
correct/incorrect memory judgement at test. Perhaps, this contribution could be in the form of 
amount of information recollected. Following this reasoning, the present research aims, first, to 
replicate the finding of a P300 effect in D. J. Turk, van Bussel, Brebner and colleagues (2011) with the 




aims to further investigate how the non-evaluative, self-referential encoding achieved through 
ownership, and the attentional bias that characterises it, are related to the self-memory advantage. 
2.1.3.2 ERP Old-New Effects  
In addition to the above, by recording ERPs during the old-new test, an investigation of ERP ‘old-new 
effects’ will also be carried out in the present study. ERP old-new effects are differences between 
the neural activity that is elicited by ‘old’, previously studied items, and ‘new’, previously unstudied 
items, that attract correct responses in an old-new test (Wilding & Ranganath, 2011). Old-new 
effects appear as larger positivities for old compared to new test items. There are two main types of 
old-new effects which have been the focus of investigation in the ERP literature on recognition 
memory: ‘early’ and ‘late’ old-new effects (for an overview of the contribution of ERPs to the study 
of memory, see Wilding & Ranganath, 2011). Rugg and colleagues (1998) proposed that the early 
old-new effect, occurring around 300-500ms post-stimulus, and presenting a mid-frontal scalp 
topography, is an ERP correlate of familiarity-driven recognition. This effect is also known as the 
‘FN400 old-new effect’, as it comprises the FN400 component. The FN400 component has been 
found to respond similarly to studied items and similar lures in a number of studies, and has been 
proposed an index of familiarity-driven recognition (Curran, 2000, 2004). In contrast, the late old-
new effect, occurring during a later time window of around 500-800ms post-stimulus, and usually 
presenting a parietal scalp topography with a left-sided maximum, has been proposed as an ERP 
correlate of episodic recollection. This effect, also termed the ‘left-parietal old-new effect’, 
comprises a late positive component (LPC) peaking at around 600ms post-stimulus. There is a large 
body of findings supporting that the latter is an index of episodic recollection; moreover, the 
magnitude of the late old-new effect is known to be sensitive to amount of information retrieved 
(Vilberg, Moosavi & Rugg, 2006). 
Studies using ERPs have also provided evidence for dual-process models of recognition memory 
(Rugg & Curran, 2007 for a concise review). Such models argue for two distinct memory processes: 
the one of recollection, which is characterised by the retrieval of qualitative information about the 
study episode, and the one of familiarity, which provides only a quantitative basis for making 
recognition judgements (see Yonelinas, 2002, for a review; these models will be discussed in more 
detail in 3.1.2). Additionally, a further functional distinction between these two memory processes 
has been proposed, whereby familiarity is a graded index of memory strength, thus will increase 
with confidence, whereas recollection is a threshold-like process, thus insensitive to confidence 




With the additional recording of ERPs during the test phase of the shopping paradigm, the present 
study also aims to investigate the ownership modulation of old-new effects and, in particular, of the 
late old-new effect. If it is true that, as initially hypothesised by Conway and Dewhurst (1995), self-
referential encoding specifically enhances episodic recollection, then one would expect to find a 
modulation of the late old-new effect by ownership, whereby the effect would be larger for self- 
versus other-owned items. 
2.1.3.3 Aims of the present investigation  
How does self-reference influence cognition, in particular, how does non-evaluative self-reference at 
encoding, and its related attentional bias, influence memory at test? In wanting to address these 
questions, the present experiment: 
1. Aims to replicate, by using a computerised version of the shopping paradigm (Cunningham et al., 
2008), the finding of a self-reference effect, that is – a memory advantage for self-owned items, 
compared to other-owned items. 
2. Aims to replicate D. J. Turk, van Bussel, Brebner and colleagues’ (2011) finding of a P300 effect 
during the encoding phase of the paradigm, expecting a larger P300 component for self-owned, 
versus other-owned items. 
3. Aims to further investigate how attentional biases during the encoding of self-related 
information relate to memory performance, by comparing P300 components at encoding, 
depending on subsequent memory at test. 
4. Finally, by also recording ERPs during the memory phase of the paradigm, aims to investigate the 
ownership modulation of old-new effects, in particular, of the late old-new effect as an index of 






2.2.  Method 
2.2.1 Participants 
Thirty-seven participants (20 female, age: M = 24.2 years, SD = 4.7 years) were recruited either 
through the School of Experimental Psychology at the University of Bristol for course credit, or 
through word-of-mouth for monetary reimbursement. All participants had normal/corrected-to-
normal colour vision, with no self-reported history of neurological/psychological disorders, were 
dominant right-handed and English native speakers. 
The study was approved by the University of Bristol Faculty of Science Research Ethics Committee 
(ID 45654). 
2.2.2 Stimuli 
The stimulus set comprised of a total of 240 digital images of items sold in major supermarkets, 
generated from internet search engines. Each image was edited so that each item appeared on a 
white background, with a black or coloured border (blue/red) and resized to 250 x 250 pixels at a 
resolution of 149 dpi. The items were divided in three sets of 80, matched on category membership 
(food, clothes and accessories, household items, electronics) and name length. Assignments of sets 
to conditions (self, other, new) was counterbalanced across participants following a Latin square 
design. Stimuli were presented on a cathode-ray tube monitor controlled by a PC using Presentation 
software (Neurobehavioural Systems, Albany, CA). 
2.2.3 Electrophysiological Recording 
Scalp potentials were recorded from 32 Ag-AgCl electrodes fitted to a standard electrode layout cap. 
Electrodes TP9/10 were removed from the cap and used to record from the left and right mastoids. 
Continuous EEG was sampled at 1000 Hz. Voltages at the scalp were sampled using a BrainAmp DC 
amplifier (Brain Products GmbH), and were referenced to the FCz electrode. Recordings were 
initiated with impedances below 10kΩ as measured by ActiCap®. EEG Analysis was performed using 
BrainVision Analyzer 1.0 (Brain Products GmbH). EEG signal from each electrode was visually 
inspected and signal from electrodes that showed persistent patterns of noise was interpolated. 
Ocular correction (Gratton, Coles & Donchin, 1983) was performed using the Fp2 electrode as 
reference for blink detection (or Fp1, in case Fp2 was interpolated). All electrodes were re-
referenced off-line to the average of the left and right mastoid signals and filtered with a bandpass 
of 0.1-25 Hz, and a notch filter of 50 Hz. Automated artifact rejection was carried out with criteria of 
a maximum change between adjacent sampling points of 10V and a maximum change of 200V 




artifacts, participants were excluded from the analysis (see 2.3.1). For each remaining participant, 
EEG data time-locked to the events of interest was epoched into 700ms segments (200 pre- and 500 
post-stimulus) for ERPs recorded during the encoding phase, and 1200ms segments (200 pre- and 
1000 post-stimulus) for ERPs recorded during the test phase. Baseline correction was performed 
beginning at 200ms pre-stimulus until stimulus onset. The resulting epochs were then signal-
averaged within each condition. These single-subject waveforms were then used to generate grand-
averaged waveforms.  
2.2.4 Procedure 
After filling in the relevant paperwork, and EEG set-up (25-45 minutes), participants were seated in 
the test room, and given on-screen instructions whilst the experimenter was present to answer any 
questions on the procedure. The experiment consisted of two tasks. First there was an encoding 
phase, followed by a memory test. Overall, the total running of the experiment, including the 
instructions, but excluding EEG set-up, took 45 minutes approximately. 
2.2.4.1 Encoding 
At the beginning of the experiment, participants were informed they would need to complete two 
‘sorting’ tasks during which they would have to sort items in different categories; however, they 
were unaware their memory for the items encountered during the first task would be later tested in 
the second task. For the encoding task, participants were informed they would need to undertake a 
computerised ‘shopping task’. During the on-screen instruction phase, they were assigned a 
shopping basket (blue or red), and informed that the experimenter was assigned the other basket. 
During the task, they were presented with shopping items on the screen, one by one, and each of 
these items was assigned either to them, or the experimenter, by means of a blue/red colour-border 
appearing around the item, to denote the ownership condition. The participant’s task was to ‘sort’ 
the items into the correct baskets according to their colour, with a left or right mouse click. 
Participants were instructed to imagine either they or the experimenter coming into ownership of 
the items assigned to them. Blue/red ownership conditions were counterbalanced, and the baskets 
changed left/right positions throughout the task. 
Each trial started with a blank screen. After a fixation cross of a variable interval of 2000-2200ms, 
the current item was presented in the centre of the computer screen, surrounded by a black border. 
After 400-600ms, the border then changed colour to blue/red (ownership cue). The appearance of 
the ownership cue denoted the event of interest to which the ERP data was time-locked to (2.2.3). 
After 800-1000ms, baskets were shown at the top left/right of the screen, for 800-1200ms, during 




would appear on each side (left/right) for 50% of trials. Participants were instructed to respond using 
the mouse, with their right hand. Response buttons were spatially aligned with the presented basket 
images, so that a left click on the mouse would indicate placing the item in the left basket, and vice 
versa for the right. At encoding, there were two blocks with 80 trials each, resulting in a total of 160 
items. Half of items in each block was self-owned, the other half other-owned. Each trial lasted for a 
total interval of 4000-5000ms (an example trial is illustrated in Figure 2.1). In addition, there was a 
50ms blank at the end of each trial, and an inter-trial blank of 1000ms.  
 
 
Figure 2.1 Example trial for the encoding task of Experiment 1. All durations are in milliseconds. 
 
2.2.4.2 Test 
After a short break, participants were informed on-screen that the second task they needed to 
complete would be a memory test. They were presented with each of the items they had seen 
during the encoding task, in addition to novel items they had not previously encountered. The items 
appeared one by one, black-bordered. The participant’s task was to indicate whether they 
remembered seeing the items before (‘old’), or the items were novel (‘new’), with a keyboard button 





After a fixation cross of 2300-2500ms, the current item was presented in the centre of the computer 
screen, black-bordered, for 600-800ms, at which point behavioural responses started being 
recorded. The presentation of the black-bordered item was the event of interest to which the ERP 
data was time-locked to (2.2.3). After the item disappeared, a reminder of which keys to press 
appeared on the screen for a further 1400-1600ms, giving participants a total response time window 
of 2000-2400ms. Participants were instructed to respond after the reminder. At test, there were a 
total of three blocks with 80 trials each, resulting in a total of 240 items. Each trial lasted for a total 
interval of 4300-4900ms (an example trial is illustrated in Figure 2.2). In addition, there was a 50ms 
blank at the end of each trial, and an inter-trial blank of 1000ms. 
 
 





2.3.1 Data Processing 
Due to technical issues, responses at test were absent for 3 participants. Out of the remaining 34 
participants, 2 were excluded as artefact rejection during preliminary data processing exceeded 10% 
of segments, leaving a sample of 32. Sensitivity index scores (d’; Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999) were 
calculated as a measure of sensitivity to signal against noise. A total of 7 participants were excluded 
from analysis on the basis of low sensitivity scores (where d’< 1; see Appendix A); these participants 
also scored under 60% overall accuracy, suggesting a low level of engagement with the task (see 
Figure 2.3). This resulted in a final sample of n = 25 for the reported behavioural and 
electrophysiological analyses, with exception of behavioural analysis of encoding responses; as 2 
participants did not make responses at encoding, a sub-sample of n = 23 was used for this analysis. 
However – as their engagement in the memory test was high (total accuracy > 60%), test data from 
these participants was included in behavioural and ERP analysis. 
 
Figure 2.3 Sensitivity index scores (d’) over total accuracy for the memory test of Experiment 1. White-
filled dots denote participants removed from the analysis due to low sensitivity and engagement (n = 7). 
 
2.3.2 Behavioural Data 
2.3.2.1 Encoding 
 
Analysis of response accuracy revealed a small proportion of errors overall (M = .01, SE = .02); 
accuracy proportions did not differ between ownership conditions, [t(22) = 0.62, p =.543], nor did 

















Analysis of response accuracy after participant exclusion showed that participants, on average, 
correctly recognised a mean proportion of .72 (SE = .02) old items, with a mean false alarm rate of 
.14 (SE = .02). A paired-samples t-test showed that the proportion of self-owned items (M = .74, SE = 
.03) recognised was higher than that of other-owned items (M = .69, SE = .03). This difference, [.05, 
BCa 95% CI (0.44, 0.87)], was significant, [t(24) = 2.14, p = .043], and represented a small-to-medium 
effect size, [d = .34]. An ANOVA of median response latencies showed that, for correct responses, 
participants’ response latencies [self: (EMM = 1041.99, SE = 32.89), other: (EMM = 1050.78, SE = 
31.72), new: (EMM = 1075.08, SE = 41.82)] did not differ significantly between conditions [F(1.33, 
31.93) = 2.15, p = .147]. 
2.3.3 Electrophysiological Data 
2.3.3.1 Encoding 
Following the analysis in D. J. Turk, van Bussel, Brebner and colleagues (2011), a factorial repeated-
measures 2x2x3 ANOVA was conducted, with a main factor of ownership (self vs. other), including 
six total electrodes via sub-factors of scalp location (central: C3, CZ, C4; parietal: P3, PZ, P4) and 
laterality (left: C3, P3; midline: CZ, PZ; right: C4, P4). Mean amplitude measures were taken at each 
electrode site over a 100-ms time window centred on the approximate P300 peak time. This time-
window was computed using BV Analyzer on the grand-averaged waveform at the PZ electrode. 
First, P300 peak times between conditions (self: 327ms, other: 334 ms) were averaged, resulting in 
an averaged P300 peak of 330ms. Then, 50ms were taken at each side of this peak, resulting in a 
time-window of 280-380ms. This analysis was repeated first on all responses, then on subsequent hit 
responses only. Mean amplitude measures over the 280-380ms window of interest are reported in 
Table 2.1 (all responses) and 2.2 (subsequent hit responses). The P300 component of the ERP is 
shown in Figures 2.4 (all responses) and 2.6 (subsequent hit responses) as a function of ownership 













Mean amplitudes and self-other differences over the 280-380ms window of the encoding phase of 
Experiment 1, at selected electrode sites. 
 Self Other Self – Other 
Electrode Mean SE Mean SE Difference 
C3 4.348 .487 3.425 .380 .923 
Cz 4.472 .518 3.682 .475 .791 
C4 4.577 .427 3.779 .399 .798 
P3 1.940 .509 1.001 .442 .939 
Pz 2.773 .584 1.869 .549 .904 
P4 1.520 .563 0.661 .565 .860 
Note. Mean amplitudes in microvolts (µV). SE = Standard Error. 
 
 
Figure 2.4 ERP grand-averaged waveforms at all electrode sites used in the ANOVA on all encoding 
responses for Experiment 1, as a function of ownership. The 280-380ms time-window used for analysis is 







Figure 2.5 Topography of the P300 effect, computed as a subtraction of self – other conditions in the 






Mean amplitudes and self-other differences over the 280-380ms window of the encoding phase of 
Experiment 1, at selected electrode sites, for subsequent hit responses. 
 Self Other Self - Other 
Electrode Mean SE Mean SE Difference 
C3 4.661 .510 3.457 .413 1.204 
Cz 4.757 .527 3.666 .515 1.091 
C4 4.853 .478 3.664 .433 1.188 
P3 2.304 .532 1.107 .466 1.198 
Pz 3.075 .575 1.880 .580 1.195 
P4 1.817 .573 .672 .600 1.145 
Note. Mean amplitudes in microvolts (µV). SE = Standard Error. 
 
Figure 2.6 ERP grand-averaged waveforms at all electrode sites used in the ANOVA on all encoding 
subsequent hit responses for Experiment 1, as a function of ownership. The 280-380ms time-window 










Figure 2.7 Topography of the P300 effect, computed as a subtraction of self – other conditions in the 






2.3.3.1.1 All Responses 
Results of the ANOVA for all encoding responses showed a significant main effect of ownership 
condition [F(1,24) = 6.966, p = .014, p2= .225], such that self-ownership cues elicited a more positive 
P300 amplitude (EMM = 3.27 V, SE = 0.45) than other-ownership cues (EMM = 2.40 V, SE = 0.41). 
This effect did not interact with scalp location [F(1,24) = 0.109, p = .744], or with laterality [F(2,48) = 
0.512, p = .602].  
2.3.3.1.2 Subsequent Memory 
Results of the ANOVA on subsequent hit responses only, that is, on ERP responses at encoding for 
stimuli that were later correctly recognised during the test phase, showed a significant main effect of 
ownership condition [F(1,24) = 6.649, p = .016, p2= .217], such that self-ownership cues elicited a 
more positive P300 amplitude (EMM = 3.58 V, SE = 0.46) than other-ownership cues  (EMM = 2.41 
V, SE = 0.44). This effect did not interact with scalp location [F(1,24) = 0.007, p = .934], or with 
laterality [F(2,48) = 0.086, p = .918]. Due to a low number of subsequent miss responses, these 
responses were not included in the ANOVA (see Appendix A). 
 
2.3.3.2        Old-New Memory Effects  
Grand-averaged ERP waveforms at test can be seen in Figures 2.8 and 2.9. Mean amplitude 
measures were taken at each electrode site over the two windows of 300-500ms and 500-800ms, 
typical, respectively, of early and late old-new effects (Curran, 2004); these are reported in Tables 
2.3 and 2.4. Repeated measures ANOVAs werethen conducted at each time window, first on all 
responses, then on correct responses only (see Appendix A for number of responses). In order to 
identify the modulation of ownership condition on old-new effects, ANOVAs included a three level 
main factor of condition (self, other and new), and nine total electrodes via sub-factors of scalp 
location (frontal: F3, FZ, F4; central: C3, CZ, C4; parietal: P3, PZ, P4) and laterality (left: F3, C3, P3; 
midline: FZ, CZ, PZ; right: F4, C4, P4); said ANOVAs are reported in the following sections. Where 
Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity was violated, degrees of freedom were 























F3 -5.39 (4.87) -5.50 (5.03) -5.62 (5.02) -5.96 (4.98) -6.41 (4.76) -6.52 (4.77) 
FZ -5.91 (5.34) -5.93 (5.39) -6.16 (5.44) -6.35 (5.42) -7.31 (5.42) -7.45 (5.34) 
F4 -5.53 (4.93) -5.53 (4.91) -5.70 (4.66) -5.78 (4.80) -6.97 (4.94) -7.19 (4.96) 
C3 -2.69 (3.95) -2.71 (3.96) -2.95 (3.85) -3.37 (4.01) -3.58 (3.96) -3.65 (4.00) 
CZ -3.23 (4.63) -3.24 (4.54) -3.69 (4.74) -3.93 (4.82) -4.76 (5.18) -4.90 (5.16) 
C4 -2.35 (3.66) -2.35 (3.68) -2.85 (3.83) -3.04 (3.96) -3.88 (4.26) -4.10 (4.31) 
P3  3.80 (3.89)  3.85 (3.96)  3.38 (3.88)  3.10 (4.36)  2.97 (4.19)  2.89 (4.29) 
PZ  3.53 (3.97)  3.57 (4.02)  3.00 (4.08)  2.82 (4.58)  2.30 (4.36)  2.19 (4.48) 
P4  4.67 (3.73)  4.65 (3.81)  4.27 (3.66)  4.11 (3.99)  3.59 (4.08)  3.44 (4.12) 
Note. Amplitude measures in microvolts (µV) with standard deviations in parentheses.  
 
Table 2.4 












F3 - 4.05 (4.47) -4.07 (4.69) -4.63 (4.92)  -4.76 (5.12) -5.16 (4.67) -5.06 (4.56) 
FZ - 4.42 (4.76) -4.22 (5.02) -4.99 (5.06) -4.96 (5.14) -6.01 (4.78) -5.88 (4.50) 
F4 - 3.91 (4.60) -3.63 (4.79) -4.42 (4.45) -4.18 (4.48) -5.96 (4.47) -5.98 (4.40) 
C3 - 0.68 (3.32) -0.41 (3.47) -1.26 (3.63) -1.24 (3.86) -2.01 (3.48) -1.78 (3.37) 
CZ - 0.47 (3.45) -0.03 (3.41) -1.24 (3.93) -0.99 (4.03) -2.40 (4.10) -2.22 (3.99) 
C4 - 0.41 (3.37)  0.06 (3.49) -1.05 (3.72) -0.76 (3.72) -2.27 (3.75) -2.23 (3.69) 
P3 3.91 (3.50)  4.34 (3.64)  3.30 (3.66)  3.58 (4.04)  2.60 (3.80) 2.78 (3.90) 
PZ 3.77 (3.60)  4.22 (3.70)  3.16 (4.05)  3.51 (4.36)  2.41 (4.11) 2.61 (4.17) 
P4 3.68 (3.09)  4.06 (3.19)  3.12 (3.31)  3.45 (3.50)  2.39 (3.79) 2.56 (3.80) 





Figure 2.9 ERP grand-averaged waveforms at electrode sites selected for the ANOVA, relative to correct 
memory judgements, during the test phase of Experiment 1. 
Figure 2.8 ERP grand-averaged waveforms at electrode sites selected for the ANOVA, relative to all 




2.3.3.2.1 Early Old-New Memory Effect (300-500ms)  
Topographies of contrasts in the early window of 300-500ms are shown in Figures 2.10 and 2.11. 
2.3.3.2.1.1 All responses 
The ANOVA on all responses relative to the 300-500ms window showed a significant main effect of 
condition, [F(2,48) = 9.815, p <.001, p2= .290]. Average ERP responses to self-owned items (EMM = -
1.46V, SE = 0.76) were more positive than ERP responses to other-owned items (EMM = -1.81V, 
SE = 0.76), which in turn were more positive than ERP responses to new items (EMM = -2.67V, SE = 
0.81). Mean differences between self and new (MD = 1.22V, p = .002, d = .32) and other and new 
(MD = 0.86V, p = .015, d = .22) were significant, yet not between self and other (MD = 0.36V, p = 
.540). An interaction between the main effect of condition and laterality was found, [F(2.07,49.68) = 
3.160,  = 0.518, p = .049, p2= .116]; pairwise comparisons revealed that the means of other and 
new differed significantly at midline (MD = 0.98V, p = .009, d = .22) and right (MD =  0.94V, p = 
.005, d = .27) sites, but not at left sites (MD = 0.61V, p = .122). Mean differences between self and 
new were significant at all lateralities (left: MD = 0.92V, p = .020, d = .25; midline: MD = 1.39V, p = 
.001, d = .32; right: MD = 1.35V, p = .001, d = .36). There was no significant three-way interaction. 
2.3.3.2.1.2 Correct Responses 
The ANOVA on correct responses only (self-hits, other-hits, correct rejections) for the 300-500ms 
window showed a significant main effect of condition, [F(2,48) = 9.047, p <.001, p2= .274]. Average 
ERP responses to self-hits (EMM = -1.47V, SE = 0.76) were more positive than ERP responses to 
other-hits (EMM = -2.04V, SE = 0.80), which in turn were more positive than ERP responses to 
correct rejections (EMM = -2.81V, SE = 0.81). The mean difference between self-hits and correct 
rejections (MD = 1.35V, p = .001, d = .35) and other-hits and correct rejections (MD = 0.77V, p = 
.042, d = .19) were significant, yet not between self and other-hits (MD = 0.58V, p = .287). An 
interaction between the main effect of condition and laterality was found, [F(2.46,59.09) = 5.482,  = 
0.615, p = .004, p2= .186]; pairwise comparisons revealed that the means of other-hits and correct 
rejections differed significantly at midline (MD = 0.91V, p = .020, d = .20) and right (MD = 1.05V, p 
= .005, d = .27) sites, but not at left sites (MD = 0.35V, p = .807). Mean differences between self-hits 
and correct rejections were significant at all lateralities (left: MD = 0.97V, p = .017, d = .26; midline: 









Figure 2.10 Topography of old-new contrasts in ERP waveforms at the 300-500ms time-window of the test 
phase of Experiment 1. Top left: self – new (all responses); top right: other – new (all responses); bottom 
left: self-hits – correct rejections; bottom right: other-hits – correct rejections. 
 
Figure 2.11 Topography of self-other contrasts in the ERP waveforms at the 300-500ms time-window of 





2.3.3.2.2 Late Old-New Memory Effect (500-800ms) 
Topographies of contrasts in the late window of 500-800ms are shown in Figures 2.12 and 2.13. 
2.3.3.2.2.1 All Responses 
The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of condition, [F(1.54, 36.92) = 8.728,  = .769, p = .002, 
p2= .267]. Average ERP responses to self-owned items (EMM = -0.29V, SE = 0.65) were more 
positive than ERP responses to other-owned items (EMM = -0.89V, SE = 0.71), which in turn were 
more positive than ERP responses to new items (EMM = -1.82V, SE = 0.73). Pairwise comparisons 
revealed a significant difference between the means of self and new (MD = 1.535V, p = .001, d = 
.45); mean differences between other and new (MD = 0.933V, p = .146) and self and other (MD = 
0.602V, p = .102) were not significant. 
A significant interaction between the main effect of condition and laterality was found, [F(2.68, 
64.30) = 3.152,  = .670, p = .036, p2= .116]. Pairwise comparisons showed that the mean difference 
of self and new was significant at all lateralities, albeit with different significance levels (left: MD = 
1.25V, p = .005, d = .37; midline: MD = 1.63V, p = .001, d = .45; right: MD = 1.73V, p = .001, d = 
.51). Although there were no other significant mean differences to emerge in these comparisons, the 
mean difference of other and new approached significance at the p < .05 level at right sites (MD = 
1.17V, p = .056, d = .33). 
A significant 3-way interaction between the main effect of condition and location and laterality was 
found, [F(8,192) = 3.760, p < .001, p2= .135). Mean differences between self and new were 
significant at all lateralities for all sites, with the mean difference at left frontal sites being the 
smallest (MD = 1.11V, p = .040, d = .25) and the mean difference at right frontal sites being the 
largest (MD = 2.05V, p <.001, d = .46). The mean difference of other and new was significant at 
right, frontal sites (MD = 1.54V, p = .004, d = .35). 
2.3.3.2.2.2 Correct Responses 
A second repeated measures ANOVA was then conducted for correct responses only (self-hits, 
other-hits and correct rejections). There was a significant main effect of condition, [F(2,48) = 8.010, p 
= .001, p2= .250]. Average ERP responses to self-hits (EMM = 0.04V, SE = 0.68) were more positive 
than ERP responses to other-hits (EMM = -0.71V, SE = 0.74), which in turn were more positive than 
correct rejections (EMM = -1.69V, SE = 0.71). Pairwise comparisons revealed a significant mean 
difference between self-hits and correct rejections (MD = 1.72V, p = .001, d = .51); whereas mean 
differences between other-hits and correct rejections (MD = 0.98V, p = .201), and self and other-




A significant interaction between the main effect of condition and laterality was found, [F(2.68, 
64.42) = 5.171,  = .671, p = .004, p2= .177]. Pairwise comparisons showed that the mean difference 
between self-hits and correct rejections was significant at all lateralities (left: MD = 1.31V, p = .015, 
d = .38; midline: MD = 1.82V, p = .001, d = .51; right: MD = 2.05V, p < .001, d = .60). A significant 
mean difference between other-hits and correct rejections also emerged at right sites (MD = 1.39V, 
p = .034, d = .40). 
A significant 3-way interaction between the main effect of condition and location and laterality was 
found, [F(8,192)= 6.754, p <.001, p2= 0.220]. The mean difference between self-hits and correct 
rejections was significant at all lateralities for central (left: MD = 1.37V, p = .011, d = .41; midline: 
MD = 2.18V, p <.001, d = .60; right: MD = 2.28V, p <.001, d = .65) and parietal (left: MD = 1.56V, 
p = .004, d = .42; midline: MD = 1.60V, p = .004, d = .42; right: MD = 1.51V, p = .008, d = .44) sites, 
but only at midline (MD = 1.66V, p = .012, d = .36) and right (MD = 2.36V, p <.001, d = .52) 
lateralities for frontal sites. The mean difference between other-hits and correct rejections was 
significant at right frontal (MD = 1.81V, p = .003, d = .42) and right central (MD = 1.47V, p = .042, d 
= .40) sites.  
2.3.4 Results Summary 
In summary, analysis of test behavioural data revealed that participants recognised a significantly 
higher number of items assigned to self than to other (2.3.2.2). Analysis of encoding ERPs revealed a 
P300 effect, whereby the self-ownership cues elicited a larger P300 than other-ownership cues; the 
P300 effect was present also amongst subsequently recognised items (2.3.3.1). With regards to 
memory ERPs (2.3.3.2), an old-new effect was found, onsetting at 300ms, whereby correctly 
recognised old items elicited more positive ERPs than correctly rejected new items (Figure 2.9). Of 
interest to the present enquiry, there was a modulation of ownership on the late parietal old-new 
effect, whereby self-hits elicited more positive ERPs than other-hits, in the 500-800ms window. 
Although this difference was apparent in the ERP waveforms, it was not statistically significant 








Figure 2.12 Topography of old-new contrasts in the ERP waveforms at the 500-800ms time-window of the 
test phase of Experiment 1. Top left: self – new (all responses); top right: other – new (all responses); 
bottom left: self-hits – correct rejections; bottom right: other-hits – correct rejections. 
Figure 2.13 Topography of self-other contrasts in the ERP waveforms at the 500-800ms time-window of 






2.4.1 P300 Effect and Subsequent Memory 
In the present experiment, during the encoding phase participants sorted pictures of objects as 
either belonging to themselves, or the experimenter, based on a colour cue, whilst ERPs were being 
recorded. A purpose of this experiment was to compare the P300 components elicited by self and 
other ownership cues at encoding. A P300 component is elicited by the engagement of higher-order 
cognitive processes associated with selective attention and resource allocation (Donchin & Coles, 
1988). Specifically, it has been suggested to index neural inhibitory activity that enhances attentional 
focus to promote memory storage (Polich, 2011). ERP responses to self-ownership cues elicited a 
P300 component that was larger in amplitude, when compared to other-ownership cues. This 
difference, referred to as ‘P300 effect’, was statistically significant, suggesting increased attentional 
processing for self-relevant stimuli. 
As well as replicating D. J. Turk and colleagues’ findings (2011), the finding of a P300 effect fits in 
within the larger framework of research on attentional biases towards self-relevant stimuli, 
described previously in this chapter (2.1.1). According to previous work by Gray and colleagues 
(2004), self-relevant stimuli receive preferential access to attentional resources, as indicated by the 
P300 effect, when compared to other, non-self-relevant stimuli. It is important to stress that, in the 
present experiment, as in D. J. Turk and colleagues’ experiment (2011), participants were aware that 
ownership of items would be temporary and fictitious, yet this was sufficient for the attentional 
benefits toward self-owned stimuli to manifest. 
With the aim to investigate the relationship between the P300 effect elicited by ownership and the 
self-memory bias observed in other behavioural studies using the shopping paradigm (Cunningham 
et al., 2008; van den Bos et al., 2010), the present experiment also included a memory test, with the 
intention to contrast ERP responses at encoding depending on subsequent memory. In the test 
phase of the study, participants were presented with the items already seen in the encoding task in 
addition to novel items, and their task was to indicate whether they remembered seeing the items 
(‘old’), or the items were novel (‘new’). Analysis of responses in the old-new memory test revealed a 
self-reference effect (SRE; Symons & Johnson, 1997), with a memory advantage for self-owned 
versus other-owned items, whereby more items assigned to self were remembered than items 
assigned to other. The effect size was consistent with that reported in Symons and Johnson’s (1997) 
meta-analytical review of the literature. 
In the present data, the number of misses epochs was low, being less than 20 for a few participants, 




waveforms for study items that were subsequently forgotten, within each of the two ownership 
conditions, the number of epochs would need to be at least 30 for each condition to be included in a 
comparison (Luck, 2014). For this reason, it was not possible to include subsequently forgotten items 
in the analysis. It is a common challenge of ERP studies of memory to reach a level of performance 
that is high enough to suggest that participants are sufficiently engaged with the task, whilst also 
obtaining enough mistake trials contributing to all conditions of interest (Rugg & Coles, 1995). 
Despite the above limitation, it was still possible to investigate self-other differences amongst 
subsequently recognised items, as planned. Results revealed a P300 effect persisted amongst 
subsequent hits, suggesting that the difference in neural activity seen at encoding of self- and other-
owned items does not only reflect that a larger number of self-owned items, compared to other-
owned items, was classified as old at test. In other words, the persistence of the effect amongst 
subsequent hit responses suggests that the self-attentional bias indexed by the P300 might be 
contributing to qualitative aspects of subsequent memory, which were not measured by the old-new 
test used in the present study. Indeed, in the present data, the modulation of the P300 component 
by ownership is not accounted for by the differentiation of encoding responses according to 
subsequent old-new memory judgements alone.  
In other ERP studies, subsequent memory effects have been found between study items that, at 
time of test, were recognised with the additional recovery of context information, and items 
recognised with sufficient information only to make an accurate recognition judgement. Results of 
these studies are mixed, and further work is needed to determine if and how ERPs are sensitive to 
encoding processes that predict whether contextual information of the study episode will be 
recovered during test (for a review, see Wilding & Ranganath, 2011). As the present study did not 
investigate whether contextual information was also recovered, when an item was recognised, it can 
not be related to this literature. Further research could investigate the attentional mechanisms of 
self-referential encoding using the ownership paradigm, by relating the P300 at encoding to the 
retrieval of contextual information. 
2.4.2 Ownership Modulation of Old-New Effects 
As part of the present experiment, ERP responses were also recorded during the test phase, in order 
to explore if and how ownership modulated old-new memory effects – in particular, the late parietal 
old-new effect. Discussion of results of old-new effects analyses will focus on correct responses, as 
per definition, old-new memory effects are “differences between the neural activity that is elicited 
by old (previously studied) and new (previously unstudied) items that attract correct task [old-new] 




onsetting at 300ms post-stimulus, whereby ERP responses for old items were more positive, overall, 
than for new items (Figures 2.8 and 2.9). This difference should not have been affected by 
behavioural response activity as instructions to respond appeared separately to, and after, the item 
(Figure 2.2). 
2.4.2.1 Early Old-New Effect 
A negative peak occurred around 400ms; this peak was of a greater (negative) amplitude for 
responses to new items than both self and other responses. With regards to the topography of this 
early old-new effect, when considering the contrast of other-new responses, the effect showed a 
clearer right frontal topography, than for the self-new contrast, where the effect maximum shifted 
towards more mid-central locations. Analysis of self-other contrasts revealed that a larger positivity 
arose for self-owned items when compared to other-owned, which presented a parietal maximum in 
its topography, albeit without constituting a significant effect (Figures 2.10 and 2.11). 
The old-new pattern described above is congruent with that of a FN400, with a frontal negative-
going peak of a 400ms latency. There were no evident differences between self and other in the 
FN400 component, thus suggesting that ownership condition did not have any significant 
modulation on this early, frontal effect. In the present study, the number of false alarms was too low 
to include them as a condition in any of the ERP analyses (see: Appendix A), meaning they could not 
be used for comparison to hit responses. As the FN400 component has been proposed as an index of 
familiarity-driven recognition (Rugg & Curran, 2007), this result can be interpreted as ERP evidence 
that self-referential encoding through ownership does not enhance familiarity-based recognition, as 
already found in behavioural studies (van den Bos et al., 2010; D. J. Turk et al., 2013).  
2.4.2.2 Late Old-New Effect 
Of particular interest to the present research is the influence of self-reference on memory retrieval, 
as measured by ERPs, as a novel aspect introduced in this experiment. As self-referential encoding 
has been proposed to enhance the recollection component of memory (Conway & Dewhurst, 1995), 
a modulation of the late parietal old-new effect by ownership was hypothesised to reflect this 
enhancement, as this ERP effect is known to be related to recollection (Rugg & Curran, 2007). The 
data showed a late old-new effect onsetting around 400-500ms post-stimulus, whereby responses to 
items correctly recognised as old (hits) were more positive-going than responses to items correctly 
classified as new (correct rejections). Specifically, the waveform pattern was consistent with the 
above hypothesis, with responses to self-owned hits being more positive than other-owned hits, 
although this difference was non-statistically significant. However, it has to be noted that, due to the 




for some items will have begun whilst ERPs for the late window of interest (500-800ms) were still 
being recorded. This would have created noise in a considerable portion of this window (600-
800ms). Although this limitation needs to be taken into account in interpreting these results, the late 
positive component peaked before the 600ms mark (Figures 2.8 and 2.9), therefore the ownership 
modulation of the late old-new effect is still apparent in the data, given its earlier onset. 
The self-other differences observed in these ERP contrasts are not attributable to targetness, as 
items in both conditions required the same type of response (‘old’). The magnitude of the late old-
new effect is known to be sensitive to amount of information retrieved (Vilberg et al., 2006). It was 
evident from the inspection of waveforms, that ownership modulated the late old-new effect, even 
if to a non-statistically significant extent. A possible interpretation is that this modulation might 
reflect a larger amount of information retrieved about self-owned items. However, as the amount of 
information retrieved about recognised items was not measured in the present paradigm, this 
interpretation is speculative. 
The topography of self-other contrasts presented a mid-central maximum (Figure 2.13). In ERP 
studies of memory, the typical parietal topography of the late old-new effect is observed when 
comparing ERPs associated with correct memory judgements which are accompanied by recollection 
of the previous occurrence of the item, to those that are not. Such comparison usually results in a 
larger effect for items accompanied by recollection, as opposed to those only recognised based on 
familiarity (Rugg & Curran, 2007). Self-reference, besides resulting in a larger number of successfully 
retrieved items, as consistently found in studies investigating the SRE (Symons & Johnson, 1997), has 
also been argued to enhance recollection of items specifically, and behavioural evidence for this 
claim has been found by using the shopping paradigm (van den Bos et al., 2010; D. J. Turk et al., 
2013). 
According to the above reasoning, self-other contrasts in the present ERP data would be expected to 
isolate the recollection component to an extent, in that recognition of self-owned items would be 
supported by the involvement of brain regions and processes specific to recollection, to a greater 
extent than other-owned items. However, it is important to stress that, to isolate the ERP 
component associated with the process of recollection, an experimental paradigm containing a test 
such as a remember-know task is needed, whereby one can compare responses that are supported 
by recollection to familiarity-based responses. In the present paradigm, a proportion of self-owned 
items might have been recognised on the basis of familiarity only, and equally, some recognised 
other-owned items might have been accompanied by recollection. Thus, comparing self- to other- 




accompanied by recollection to a greater extent than other-hits. As the present experiment did not 
make use of a test such as the R-K task, the above interpretation of observed self-other differences 
in the late old-new effect is made with caution and needs further investigation. Future ERP studies 
that aim to investigate how self-reference modulates the late old-new memory effect could employ 
paradigms that allow an experimental dissociation of the processes of recollection and familiarity. 
In addition to the above interpretation, self-other differences observed in the ERP waveform might 
also reflect the involvement of self-specific brain structures (Northoff et al., 2006). Future studies 
could aim to investigate whether the self-other differences observed during memory retrieval are 
qualitative rather than quantitative in nature; specifically, whether (a) they can be attributed to the 
activity in self-specific brain structures involved in the retrieval of self-related stimuli, or (b) they can 
be attributed to differences in the level of activity in the same structures involved in retrieval of 
other-related stimuli. Importantly, these possibilities are not mutually exclusive; another possibility 
is that (c) the self-other differences seen in the present study might be supported by brain regions 
that are both involved in self-specific processing, and memory retrieval. As described concisely by 
Rugg and Coles (1995): “differing ERP scalp distributions provide a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition for the conclusion that functionally distinct processes have been identified” (p.34). Given 
the limitations posed by using ERP-technique, future studies could employ other imaging techniques 
which allow one to make firmer conclusions about the functional distinction of processes of interest, 
in this case, whether self-specific brain structures support the processes that elicited the observable 




3 Experiment 2 
3.1 Introduction to Experiment 2 
3.1.1  Experiment 1 findings 
In Experiment 1 event-related potentials (ERPs) were recorded whilst participants completed a 
shopping paradigm and a subsequent old-new memory test. A self-reference effect (SRE; Symons & 
Johnson, 1997) was found, with a memory bias for items encoded within a self-ownership context. 
More self-owned items were remembered than other-owned items. On the basis of the hypothesis 
that self-referential encoding enhances recollection specifically (Conway & Dewhurst, 1995), the ERP 
data from the test phase of Experiment 1 was hypothesised to show an ownership modulation of the 
late-parietal old-new effect, well-characterised in the literature as an index of recollection, (Rugg & 
Curran, 2007), to reflect the expectation that recognition of self-owned items would be 
accompanied by recollection to a greater extent than that of other-owned items. 
Results of Experiment 1 revealed a modulation of the late old-new effect by ownership, with self-hits 
eliciting larger positivities than other-hits, when compared to correct rejections. However, self-other 
differences were not statistically significant. It was argued that a proportion of self-owned items 
classified as ‘old’ in the old-new test used might have been recognised on the basis of familiarity 
processes only, and thus comparing self-other hit responses could not isolate the recollection 
component of memory, even though self-hit responses might have been accompanied by 
recollection to a greater extent than other-hit responses. As the old-new test used in the paradigm 
did not provide an experimental dissociation of the processes of recollection and familiarity, a 
further investigation of the ownership modulation was proposed, that uses a different memory test, 
to investigate the mechanisms eliciting the self-other differences observed (see 2.4 for discussion of 
Experiment 1 findings). 
3.1.2  Dual-process models of recognition memory 
A prominent account of recognition memory, dual-process models distinguish between the two 
processes of recollection and familiarity (for a review, see Yonelinas, 2002). The distinction between 
the two is illustrated by the common experience of recognising someone as familiar (knowing) 
without being able to recollect who they are, or where one has previously encountered them 
(remembering). It has previously been found that, when recognition is accompanied by recollective 
experience, participants have a strong feeling of the self-reference of the remembered event 
(Conway & Dewhurst, 1995). Conway and Dewhurst offered a potential explanation for this in that 




Instead, when one’s memory for a fact, or a person, is only accompanied by feelings of familiarity, 
lacking recollective experience, self-reference is not necessarily entailed in remembering.  
According to several dual-process models, recognition memory judgements are supported by these 
two distinguished processes. These models (e.g., Atkinson & Juola, 1973, 1974; Jacoby, 1991; 
Mandler, 1979; Tulving, 1985; Yonelinas, 1994) agree about some defining characteristics of 
recollection and familiarity, as reviewed by Yonelinas (2002). First, familiarity is quicker than 
recollection and is supported by brain regions that are earlier in the processing stream. Moreover, 
recollection and familiarity are independent during retrieval, however their relationship during 
encoding is less clear. Furthermore, some models describe familiarity using signal detection theory, 
whereby the familiarity signal for old items exceeds that of new items, but their distributions 
overlap, whilst recollection has been described as a threshold process (Yonelinas, 2002). 
Vilberg and Rugg (2008) conducted a meta-analytical review of event-related fMRI studies on the 
loci of ‘retrieval effects’ (the fMRI equivalent of ERP old-new effects) elicited by familiarity- and 
recollection-related recognition judgements. In particular, they were interested in the modulation of 
activity in the parietal cortex by type of judgement. Results of their meta-analysis showed that 
familiarity and recollection-related retrieval effects were localised to different areas of the lateral 
parietal cortex. More specifically, familiarity-related effects were localised around the intra-parietal 
sulcus (IPS), whereas recollection-related effects were localised to the posterior part of the inferior 
parietal cortex. 
From their findings of the above dissociation, Vilberg and Rugg (2008) concluded that retrieval-
related effects cannot be explained by a single memory process, thus providing more evidence for 
dual-process models of recognition memory. Furthermore, they also suggested that the retrieval-
related activity in inferior parietal cortex indicates specificity of this region in recollection. On the 
contrary, activity observed in superior parietal cortex (including the IPS), indexes activity related to 
successful retrieval yet without the implication of specificity of this region in familiarity-based 
recognition. 
3.1.2.1 The R-K task 
A functional dissociation of the two processes of recollection and familiarity cannot be inferred from 
old-new tests which do not include a manipulation distinguishing between the two (Gardiner, 2008). 
In order to determine the effect that self-reference has on underlying memory processes, 
specifically, on the memory processes that correspond to the experience of episodic recollection, an 




experimental manipulation can be process-pure. At present, amongst the paradigms that best serve 
this purpose is the ‘remember-know’ task (R-K task), initially developed by Tulving (1985). 
In the remember-know (R-K) task, participants are first asked whether they remember seeing an 
item before (‘yes’ or ‘no’), in a similar way to an old-new test. When a ‘yes’ response is given, the 
participant is then asked to judge whether they recollect something they consciously experienced at 
the time of seeing the item at first, that is, they have an episodic recollection of seeing the item 
(‘remember’), or whether the item seems familiar in that they feel confident they have seen it 
before, however they do not recollect anything else they experienced when they saw it at first 
(‘know’). Further to the initial R-K task, an option of ‘guess’ response is also included in Gardiner and 
Richardson-Klavehn’s (2000) version of the task, so to remove a potential confounding for 
recognition decisions that are not associated neither with experiences of remembering nor with 
knowing, instead with strategically based decisions, or mere mistakes. 
Although the use of the R-K task to estimate the contribution of recollection and familiarity-based 
recognition to memory has been disagreed upon, in his review Yonelinas (2002) concluded that the 
R-K task is comparable to other tasks used to dissociate recollection and familiarity, for instance, the 
‘process-dissociation’ procedure, first developed by Jacoby (1991). In this procedure, participants 
study two lists of items, one presented visually, and one auditorily. Recollection is then measured as 
memory for the study context. A potential limitation of this procedure is that it does not account for 
partial recollection, that is, the recollection of information that does not contribute towards the 
distinction of seen/heard. In contrast, as the R-K procedure measures recollection based on 
subjective reports, it accounts for partial recollection. Also, in favour of Yonelinas’s argument that 
the R-K task is a valid experimental dissociation of the two processes, ‘remember’ and ‘know’ 
responses typically present different ERP and fMRI correlates (Rugg & Curran, 2007; Vilberg & Rugg, 
2008). 
3.1.3  The Self-Reference Recollection Effect (SRRE) 
The above distinction between remembering and knowing can be useful to investigate the impact of 
self in recognition memory, in that encoding manipulations that trigger self-reference, such as the 
shopping paradigm, should enhance recollective experience. Information encoded through self-
reference benefits from the elaborative nature of the self-construct (Symons & Johnson, 1997). Self-
referential manipulations can aid the formation of subjective, episodic representations of the 
original event which are rich in detail, such that when the event is successfully remembered, self-




that the memory advantage should be present for those items that are recollected, versus those 
remembered on the basis of a sense of familiarity only (Conway & Dewhurst, 1995). 
Evidence has been found in support of the above prediction, leading Conway, Dewhurst, Pearson 
and Sapute (2001) to rename the SRE the ‘self-reference recollection effect’ (SRRE). As previously 
discussed, van den Bos and colleagues (2010) first found evidence for the specific enhancement of 
the recollection component of memory by using ownership to trigger self-reference (see 2.1.2). The 
SRRE occurred without the need for explicit self-evaluation, as the shopping task implies incidental, 
non-evaluative self-reference, as opposed to the trait-adjective task originally used. Thus, van den 
Bos and colleagues (2010) concluded that the SRRE is not limited to explicit self-evaluation tasks but 
may apply to a broader range of self-referential contexts, such as for example the one of the 
shopping task. The similarity between the self-referential memory advantage obtained through 
explicit self-evaluation and that elicited by ownership in the shopping task speaks to the deep 
influence of self on cognition (D. J. Turk et al., 2008). 
3.1.4  The present investigation 
3.1.4.1  The SRRE in the ownership paradigm: behavioural investigation 
As recollection and familiarity were confounded in the old-new task used in Experiment 1, this 
prevented further investigation of if and how the ERP data reflected the specificity of the self-
memory enhancement to recollection, that is, the above-mentioned SRRE (Conway et al., 2001). 
Following the considerations outlined in previous sections, and the limitations of Experiment 1, 
namely, the lack of experimental dissociation of the processes of recollection and familiarity-driven 
recognition, in Experiment 2 the remember-know (R-K) test will be used in conjunction with the 
shopping paradigm. Additionally, as in van den Bos and colleagues (2010), a further option of ‘guess’ 
will also be included (Gardiner & Richardson-Klavehn, 2000), so that remembering and knowing are 
independent, yet not mutually exclusive, response options. At this stage of the present investigation, 
ERPs will not be recorded; instead, the present behavioural investigation will also aim to determine 
whether the paradigm used proves viable for using in the proposed ERP investigation, as explained 
in detail in the following section. 
3.1.4.2  The proposed ERP investigation and its viability 
Besides looking to replicate van den Bos and colleagues’s (2010) finding of a SRRE, another aim of 
Experiment 2 is to verify whether the paradigm used would produce the required number of trials 
associated with each type of response in order to contrast the electrophysiological differences 
between ownership conditions within remember responses (in other words, the ERP correlates of 




participants per condition of interest, in order to reach sufficient signal-to-noise ratio. Reaching this 
number of trials for recollection responses in both ownership conditions would allow a valid 
electrophysiological investigation of the ownership SRRE. 
Although the functional significance of the parietal old-new effect has been source of extensive 
debate (Rugg & Curran, 2007) one hypothesis is that it indexes processes that contribute to the 
representation of recollected information (Wilding & Rugg, 1996), or otherwise that it might index 
attentional orienting to recollected information (Rugg & Henson, 2002). The finding that the size of 
the effect is related to the amount of information recollected (Vilberg et al., 2006), supports the 
former hypothesis over the latter. Either way, it is of interest to the present research to investigate 
whether the self-reference recollection effect usually observed in behaviour can also be observed in 
an ownership modulation of the late parietal old-new effect. This observation would be in the form 
of a larger effect for self-owned items, when compared to other-owned items, amongst items that 
are successfully retrieved with the experience of recollection. 
If the behavioural data produced a number of responses sufficient for an ERP study, such study 
would then be capable of investigating whether: 
1. There was no modulation of ownership on the parietal old-new effect, that is, no observable 
difference between ownership conditions amongst ERP waveforms elicited by recognition 
judgements accompanied by recollection. This would signify that the modulation of the old-new 
effect by ownership, as found in Experiment 1, might be accounted for solely by the fact that 
recognition of self-owned items is accompanied by recollection to a greater extent than other-
owned items. This result would still count as evidence for the specific enhancement of 
recollection by self-reference through ownership; however, the observed self-other differences 
could be accounted for, at least in principle, solely by an enhanced involvement of the same 
neural processes supporting recollection of non-self-referred items. In other words, this result 
would not directly support the involvement of self-specific neural processes in the retrieval of 
self-referred items. 
2. A modulation of the parietal old-new effect occurred, whereby contrasts of self-other within 
remember responses would reveal a larger ERP response for self, compared to other. At least 
three potential explanations for this difference would be plausible: (a) that self-referential 
encoding enhances elaborative episodic representation of the original event and its recollection, 
and this is reflected in the late parietal old-new effect, as LPC magnitude is known to vary 
depending on the amount of information recollected; (b) that the retrieval of self-referential 




the ERP; and (c) a combination of (a) and (b), whereby activity both in self-specific regions and 
regions that support episodic retrieval would elicit the self-other differences in the ERP. 
In the following sub-section, the approach taken in designing the present experiment is described; 
the overall purpose of the calculations described below is that of obtaining enough epochs in each 
condition of interest, for the proposed ERP investigation to be attainable using such paradigm. 
3.1.4.2.1 Experimental Design 
Hit rates in van den Bos and colleagues (2010) suggest that, in their study, a proportion of roughly 
.20 of ‘old’ responses were familiarity-driven, ‘know’ responses (.178 for self-owned items, .218 for 
other-owned items; see Table 3.1). It is likely that, in Experiment 1, a comparable proportion of 
correct memory judgements was also based on familiarity, given the similarity in the encoding 
paradigm used. By differentiating remember and know responses, Experiment 2 allows an 
investigation of the self-reference recollection effect (SRRE; Conway et al., 2001). Furthermore, it 
allows to verify whether the number of responses obtained would be such that, in a proposed ERP 
investigation of the SRRE using the ownership paradigm, enough epochs would be obtained to 
compare the conditions of interest. In order to do this, one would need to obtain at least 30 
responses (Luck, 2014) in the remember-self (SR) and the remember-other (OR) conditions, to be 
compared to correct rejections (CR). This would allow to investigate how self-reference (that is, the 
ownership manipulation) modulates the late parietal old-new effect, and if this mirrors the self-
reference effect observed in behaviour, in the form of a larger ERP response for self-owned items, 
when compared to other-owned. With regards to sample size, according to power estimates, with a 
self/other/new comparison at test (repeated-measures ANOVA, 1 group, 3 factors), to reach a 
medium-sized effect (f = 0.25), with Power = .90 (1 - β; α = 0.05), the estimated final sample size for 
analysis would be of 36 participants (critical F = 3.13). 
Given that, assuming a SRE is found, the number of self-owned correctly recognised items is higher 
than other-owned, one would need to ensure there are enough other-owned items accompanied by 
correct memory judgements, or hits, to compare to self-owned hits, within ‘remember’ responses. 
According to the R/K proportion relative to other-owned items, as estimated from the accuracy data 
in van den Bos and colleagues (2010; see Table 3.1), OR responses would be 2.197 times OK 
responses (.479 divided by .218). If one wanted to reach a minimum threshold of 30 epochs for OR 
responses, OK responses would be estimated to 13.7 (30 divided by 2.197), resulting in a minimum 
required total number of other-hits of 43.7 (30 plus 13.7). In Experiment 1, this threshold was only 
reached by a proportion of .625 participants. To increase this proportion to .80, there would need to 




other-hit rate of .46 or higher. However, this hit-rate was equivalent to only 37 epochs for other-hits, 
when total number of other-owned items was 80. In order to increase the number of other-hits to 
43.7 (OR = 30; OK = 13.7) at the .80 participants threshold, presuming that such proportion of 
participants would still perform at an accuracy rate of .46 or higher on other-owned items, one 
would need 95 items (43.7 divided by .46). As the self-hit rate for participants at the proportion 
threshold of .80 in Experiment 1 was .52, participants would have at least 49.4 (.52 multiplied by 95) 
epochs for self-hits, and, according to a self-owned R/K proportion of 3.151 (.561 divided by .178), as 
estimated from van den Bos and colleagues (2010), they would have 37.5 (49.4 divided by 4.151 
multiplied by 3.151) epochs for the SR condition. 
According to the above calculations, a paradigm with 95 items per conditions would reach the 
number of SR and OR responses to satisfy requirements for carrying an ERP analysis comparing 
ownership conditions within remember responses, on at least a proportion of .80 of the total sample 
of participants. In van den Bos and colleagues (2010), accuracy was 2% higher for both self and 
other-owned items, than in Experiment 1, which had an increase of 30 items in each condition 
compared to van den Bos and colleagues’ paradigm. If one assumed a similar pattern of decrease in 
accuracy in Experiment 2, then one would expect to see a further decrease of 1% for an increase of 
15 items per condition. However, accuracy might not decrease linearly with item increase, and 
further increasing the number of items would potentially cause participant disengagement, due to 
length of the task; therefore, the number of items is kept to 95 per condition (with a total of 285, 
including new items) in Experiment 2. 
Experiment 1 had a final sample size of n = 25 participants. Assuming that a proportion of .80 
participants reaches a threshold of 30 epochs in the conditions of interest, according to estimates 
described above, to reach a final sample size of n = 36 participants, Experiment 2 will need a total 
sample of N = 45 participants. In considering the possibility that increasing the number of items to 
285 caused an overall decrease in accuracy, testing a total sample of N = 45 participants allows the 
proportion of valid participants to get as low as 62.5% to still reach sufficient power (1 - β = .80; n = 
28 participants). 
With regards to K responses, according to estimates based on van den Bos and colleagues (2010), 
with 43.7 epochs for other-hits at the .80 proportion of participants cut-off, there would only be 
25.7 epochs (K-S: 12; K-O: 13.7) for K responses collapsed across conditions. Yet with a total sample 
of 45 participants, the R vs. K vs. CR analysis could still be carried out on a sub-sample of participants 
that reached the threshold for 30 epochs in a K condition collapsed across self-other, avoiding a 




aim of an ERP version of this experiment, thus the focus remains on reaching a sufficient number of 
responses for items that are recollected in this behavioural experiment. 
 
Table 3.1 
Proportion Correct Responses in van den Bos et al. (2010) and in Experiment 1. 
   Self   Other 
R K G TOT  R K G TOT  
van den Bos et al. 
(2010) 
HTR .561 .178 .042 .739  .479 .218 .050 .697  
FAR .009 .042 .026 .051  .009 .042 .026 .051  
Experiment 1 HTR ̶ .712  ̶ .671  
FAR ̶ .132  ̶ .132  
Note. Proportion correct responses (hit rates) were calculated as number of correct responses divided by 
number of total items within each condition. HTR = Hit Rate; FAR = False Alarm Rate; R = Remember; K = Know; 







A total of 52 undergraduate students (46 females, mean age 20.4 years) in the School of 
Psychological Science at the University of Bristol took part in the study in exchange for course credit. 
All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal colour vision, were dominant right-handed, and 
native or fluent English speakers, who reportedly lived in the UK for more than two years. 
Participants gave informed consent according to the guidelines set by the University of Bristol’s 
Faculty of Science Human Research Ethics Committee (ID 73461). 
3.2.2 Stimuli and Apparatus 
The stimulus set comprised of a total of 285 digital images of items sold in major supermarkets; 240 
of these images were the same used in Experiment 1, and 45 additional images were selected from 
the Bank of Standardised Stimuli (BOSS v.2; Brodeur, Guérard & Bouras, 2014), that matched the 
requirements of the initial set (2.2.2). Each image was edited so that each item appeared on a white 
background, with a black or coloured border (blue/red) and resized to 250 x 250 pixels at a 
resolution of 149 dpi. The items were divided in three sets of 95, matched on category membership 
(food and drink, clothing and accessories, household items, electronics) and name length. 
Assignments of sets to conditions (self, other, new) was counterbalanced across participants 
following a Latin square design. The experiment was programmed and run using the MATLAB 
software v.R2016. Stimuli were presented on a DELL PC monitor at a resolution of 1920 x 108, 60Hz. 
3.2.3 Procedure 
Participants were seated at the PC in the test room and invited to fill in the relevant paperwork. 
They were then given on-screen instructions whilst the experimenter was present to answer any 
questions on the experiment. The experiment consisted of two tasks: an encoding phase, followed 
by a memory test. At the beginning of the experiment, participants were informed they would need 
to complete two ‘sorting’ tasks during which they would have to sort items in different categories; 
however, they were unaware their memory for the items encountered during the first task would be 
later tested in the second task. 
3.2.3.1 Encoding 
For the encoding task, participants were informed they would need to undertake a computerised 
‘shopping task’. During the on-screen instruction phase, they were assigned a shopping basket 
(either blue or red), and the experimenter was assigned the other basket. They were informed that 
they would see shopping items on the screen, one by one, and each of these items would be 




appear around the item, to denote who the item was assigned to. The participant’s task would be to 
‘sort’ the items into the correct baskets by colour matching the ownership cue to the colour of the 
basket, using either the left/right arrow key depending on location of the baskets, whilst imagining 
either they or the experimenter coming into ownership of the current item. Blue/red basket 
assignment conditions were counterbalanced between participants, and baskets changed positions 
so that the blue basket would appear on the left side for half the trials, and vice versa. Figure 3.1 
represents a full encoding trial sequence, including presentation times. There was an inter-trial 
interval of 1 second, and 38 trials for each block, resulting in a total of 5 blocks (190 trials). Half of 
items in each block were self-owned, the other half other-owned. Order of presentation of the items 
was randomised. 
 
Figure 3.1 Example trial for the encoding task of Experiment 2. Times are in milliseconds. RT (var.) = 
reaction time (variable). 
 
3.2.3.2 Test 
After a short break, participants were informed that the second task they needed to complete would 
be a memory test. For this task, participants received print instructions. They were told they would 
be presented with each of the items they had seen during the encoding task, plus some novel items 
they had not previously encountered. The participant’s task would be to indicate first whether they 
recognised the item from the encoding task (‘yes’), or the item was novel (‘no’). Then, in case they 




accompanied by recollective experience, or by strong feelings of familiarity in the absence of any 
recollective experience. If recognition brought back to mind something they consciously experienced 
at the moment of first seeing the item, they were instructed to respond ‘remember’ (‘R’), whereas if 
they did not recollect anything they experienced then, they were instructed to respond ‘know’ (‘K’). 
The experimenter made sure that participants did not interpret this difference as being “sure” or 
“unsure” and explained that, in both cases, the response would mean that they were confident they 
had seen in the item in the previous task. Finally, they were also given a further response option of 
‘guess’ (‘G’), in case their response was a guess, or a mistake (see Appendix B for the full test 
procedure instructions that were given to participants, adapted from Gardiner & Richardson-
Klavehn, 2000). The experimenter then asked participants to confirm they understood the difference 
between remembering and knowing, in their own words. Figure 3.2 represents a full trial sequence, 
including presentation times. There was an inter-trial interval of 1 second, and 57 trials for each 
block, resulting in a total of 5 blocks (285 trials). Order of presentation of the items was randomised. 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Example trial for the memory test of Experiment 2. Times are in milliseconds. RT (var.) = 








3.3.1  Data processing 
Out of the total sample of 52 participants who took part in the study, 3 did not complete the 
experiment due to machine failure, leaving a total sample of N = 49 for analysis. Data was analysed 
using the IBM SPSS software (v.24). 
Participants sensitivity scores (d’) and bias scores (c) for the yes/no memory test were taken into 
account as normalised c scores (c’, or c-prime; obtained by dividing c by d’; see Macmillan & 
Creelman, 1990). Analysis of these scores by visual inspection of scatterplots and boxplots revealed 
that most participants had a bias for responding ‘no’ (positive scores of c’); for participants whose 
overall accuracy was lowest, c’ scores were highest. The two criteria of overall accuracy and c’ were 
used in conjunction to exclude participants on the basis of low engagement with the task, denoted 
by overall accuracy scores, and low sensitivity/high response bias, denoted by c’ scores. Out of the 
final sample of N = 49, 8 participants were excluded from the memory analysis as they performed 
poorly in the memory test, as denoted by a high bias to respond ‘no’ (c’ > 1) and low overall accuracy 
(≤ .50 proportion correct). One further participant was excluded on the basis of their c’ score only (-
1.2; overall accuracy = .69), as it indicated a bias to respond ‘yes’ that considerably diverged from 
the trend of c’ plotted against overall accuracy (see: Figure 3.3). This left a sample of 40 for the 
memory analysis (see Appendix C for a full list of participants with memory test responses). 
 
Figure 3.3 Normalised c scores (c’) plotted against overall accuracy at memory test in Experiment 2. 
White-filled dots denote participants excluded from the analysis. One participant is not represented on 
the graph because of a very high c’ score (values: x = 0.39, y = 11.5); this participant was also excluded 





















3.3.2  Encoding 
During the encoding phase, accuracy data from 3 participants was missing due to a recording failure, 
leaving a sample of 46 for encoding accuracy analysis. Latency data from the encoding phase was 
instead analysed for the full sample. During the encoding phase, participants were very accurate 
overall (99%); the difference in mean accuracy scores between conditions was not significant, 
[t(1,45) = 0.688, p = .495], nor was the difference in mean latency scores [t(1,48) = 0.561, p = .578]. 
3.3.3  Memory 
The final sample for memory analysis, after the above participant exclusion, was n = 40. Due to a 
script recording fault, n = 4 participants were excluded from the memory awareness analysis as their 
remember/know/guess responses were not recorded correctly; however, their data was used for the 
old-new analysis. This left a final sub-sample of n = 36 for the memory awareness analysis. 
3.3.3.1 Overall accuracy: old-new test 
Overall mean accuracy in the final sample was .66 (SD = .10). Hit rates (HRs) and false alarm rates 
(FARs) were calculated; FARs were subtracted from HRs for each response type for correction (see 
Table 3.2). Resulting corrected hit rates were submitted to a single-factor (ownership: self or other) 
repeated measures ANOVA, which revealed a significant main effect of ownership, [F(1,39) = 6.803, 
MSE = 0.006, p = .013, p2 = .149]; whereby participants recognised a higher proportion of self-
owned items (EMM = .443, SE = 0.034) than other-owned items (EMM = .399, SE = 0.027). 
3.3.3.2 Memory awareness: R-K test 
As guess responses were low overall (with an average proportion of .03), they were not included as a 
factor in the memory awareness analysis. A 2 (ownership: self or other) x 2 (memory awareness: 
remember or know) ANOVA was applied to remember and know corrected hit rates which revealed 
a main effect of ownership, [F(1,35) =6.895, MSE = 0.003, p = .013, p2 = .165]. Overall, more items 
owned by self (EMM = .213, SE = .019) were recognised, versus items owned by other (EMM = .188, 
SE = .014). 
This analysis also revealed an interaction between ownership and memory awareness, [F(1,35)= 
5.342, MSE = 0.016, p = .027, p2 = .132]. Analysis of simple contrasts revealed an ownership effect 
within remember responses, whereby the mean difference between the proportion of remembered 
self-owned and other-owned items (MD = .073, SE = 0.027), was statistically significant (p = .012), 
with a higher proportion of self-owned items remembered (EMM = .317, SE = 0.032) than other-




owned items (EMM = .133, SE = .023) recognised on the basis of knowing than self-owned items 
(EMM = .109, SE = .020), however this difference was not significant (p = .182). 
3.3.3.2.1 I-Know correction 
In a classic R-K paradigm with only two response options (Tulving, 1985), these responses are 
assumed to be mutually exclusive; that is, ‘remembering’ and ‘knowing’ can never co-occur, because 
participants respond either remember/R or know/K for each item, never both. If a K response is 
given only when there is no recollective experience, this type of response likely underestimates the 
probability that an item is familiar (Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995), as familiarity can co-occur with 
recollection. When guess/G is also included as a response option, presumably the two responses are 
no longer mutually exclusive. However, as G responses were low overall in the present experiment 
(see Appendix C), the mutual exclusivity of the two responses may still constitute an issue. For this 
reason, Yonelinas and Jacoby’s (1995) independence correction for know responses was applied to 
the present analysis. To estimate the probability that an item is familiar (F), one can divide the 
proportion of K responses by the opportunity the subject has to make a K response (1 – R), according 
to the following formula (Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995, p.630): 
[ F = K/(1 – R) ]. 
Independent-know (I-Know) proportions calculated with this formula are also reported in Table 3.2.  
Following the above correction, a further 2 (ownership: self or other) x 2 (memory awareness: 
remember or independent-know) ANOVA was applied to remember and I-know corrected hit rates. 
There was a significant main effect of ownership, [F(1,35) = 7.917, MSE = 0.009, p = .008, p2 = .184]. 
Overall, more items owned by self (EMM = .275, SE = .026) were recognised, versus items owned by 
other (EMM = .230, SE = .017). 
In this analysis, the interaction between ownership and memory awareness, [F(1,35) = 3.152, MSE = 
0.009, p = .085], was not significant. More self-owned items (EMM = .317, SE = .032) than other-
owned items (EMM = .244, SE = .025) were recollected, and this difference (MD = .073, SE = .027) 
was significant (p = .012). More self-owned items (EMM = .233, SE = .029) than other-owned items 
(EMM = .217, SE = .024) were recognised on the basis of familiarity, however this difference was 








Mean Proportions of Correct Responses and False Alarm Rates for the Test Phase of Experiment 2. 
 Total Remember Know I-Know 
 Self Other Self Other Self Other Self Other 
HTR 
FAR 
.588 (.168) .545 (.133) .361 (.174) .289 (.146) .193 (.106) .216 (.118) .317 (.159) .301 (.233) 
.145 (.107) .045 (.062) .084 (.086) .084 (.086) 
Note. Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of raw hit rates (HTR) and false alarm rates (FAR), as a 




Figure 3.4 Remember, know and I-know corrected hit rates shown as a function of ownership condition 
for Experiment 2. 
 
3.3.4 Viability of proposed ERP investigation 
Further analyses revealed that only a proportion of .60 participants performed at a rate of .46 for 
other-owned hits (the original expectation was that this would occur for a proportion of .80 
participants). Out of the sub-sample of n = 36 participants used for the memory awareness analysis, 
only 11 (a proportion of .31) reached the number of responses required (>=30) for an ERP 
comparison of ownership conditions within remember responses (full response data is reported in 


















3.4.1 Behavioural findings 
In the present experiment, during the encoding phase, participants sorted a series of objects either 
assigned to themselves (self-owned), or to the experimenter (other-owned) into shopping baskets. 
Later on, when re-presented with the already seen items (old), in addition to novel items (new), they 
were asked to make an old-new distinction, and in case items were recognised as old, they were 
asked to make a further distinction on whether they recollected seeing the items in the previous 
task (remember), they just had a strong feeling of familiarity with the items from the previous task 
(know), or neither of the two (guess). 
3.4.1.1 SRE 
Results showed that, when comparing hits (correctly recognised old items) and misses (old items 
incorrectly classified as new), a ‘self-reference effect’ (SRE) was found, whereby more items assigned 
to self at encoding were recognised at test, compared to items assigned to other. This finding 
contributes to a robust literature on the SRE (see Symons & Johnson, 1997 for a review), and 
specifically, replicates the findings of Experiment 1, and those of Cunningham and colleagues (2008), 
that self-reference enhances memory even when it is incidental and non-evaluative, such as in the 
present experiment with the use of the shopping task. By dividing items into self-owned and other-
owned categories, participants were not directed to perform any elaborative self-referential 
encoding, such as, for example, in a standard trait-rating task (e.g., Kelley et al., 2002), yet the 
memorial pattern of self-referential encoding still emerged in the memory data. 
3.4.1.2 SRRE 
According to dual-process models of recognition memory, a retrieval cue (such as a studied item 
presented during test phase), can elicit two different types of memory signal: a multi-dimensional 
‘recollection signal’, providing qualitative information of the study event, including its context, and a 
scalar ‘familiarity signal’, supporting a simple judgement of the prior occurrence of the item (Rugg & 
Vilberg, 2013). When, in the present data, correct memory judgements were separated into those 
accompanied by recollection (remembering) and those that were not (knowing), the self-referential 
memory enhancement only occurred within the former, and not the latter. Given that the R-K task is 
a reliable experimental dissociation of the two processes of recollection and familiarity (Yonelinas, 
2002), the effect found is better described as the self-reference recollection effect (SRRE; Conway et 
al., 2001), as the two states of memory awareness of recollection and familiarity were affected 




hypothesis that self-reference through ownership enhances recollection selectively, replicating 
previous findings by van den Bos and colleagues (2010; also see D. J. Turk et al., 2013). 
These findings speak to the deep influence of self on cognition (D. J. Turk et al., 2008), through which 
self-relevant information (such as owned objects), is subject to enhanced processing at encoding, 
and enhanced episodic memory retrieval. It has been argued that self-reference aids elaboration 
through the activation of self-schemas, by which participants apply extant self-knowledge to 
representations of self-referenced information at encoding (Symons & Johnson, 1997). Consistent 
with this view, in the present study, a few participants reported verbally, during debrief, that as they 
performed the shopping task they were “creating a narrative” on how they would use the objects 
gained during the task. Moreover, attention and affective systems might also contribute to the 
ownership effect; in particular, self-ownership cues are likely to attract attention and also elicit 
affective arousal (D. J. Turk et al., 2011). 
3.4.2  Viability of Proposed ERP Investigation 
A limitation of Experiment 1 was that the old-new paradigm used at test did not differentiate 
between the two processes of familiarity and recollection, therefore not allowing further analysis of 
the modulation of ownership on the ERP correlates of recollection. Besides replicating previous 
findings, another aim of Experiment 2 was to investigate whether such paradigm would be 
employable in a proposed ERP investigation of the SRRE. Specifically, the aim was to evaluate 
whether enough responses would be obtained in the self and other conditions within remember 
memory judgements, to compare ERP correlates of recollection between ownership conditions. The 
paradigm used in the present investigation was designed with the aim of obtaining enough 
responses to make such comparison possible (see 3.1.4.2.1). 
However, there was a sharp overall mean proportion accuracy decrease compared to Experiment 1 
(see 3.3.4). This decrease in accuracy might have been due to the length of the task and the number 
of items, which posed strain on participant engagement. When considering the minimum number of 
responses required for a successful ERP comparison of self and other conditions within the 
remember condition of interest, this number (30 epochs) was only reached in 11 participants. This 
result speaks clearly to the limitations of ERP as a technique for scientific investigation of cognitive 
processes; more specifically, obtaining enough epochs for comparison of different conditions of 
interest, whilst keeping the task engaging for participants without compromising their performance, 
is a well-discussed challenge of using ERP technique (e.g., Wilding & Ranganath, 2011). 
In conclusion, the ERP investigation proposed is not viable with the use of the present paradigm. 




use of the remember-know task, beyond allowing for an estimate of proportions of R-K responses 
within correct memory judgements. In this way, the finding of a SRRE using the present paradigm 
can still be of use in interpreting the ownership modulation of the ERP old-new effect found in 




4 General Discussion 
4.1 Summary of Present Findings and Limitations  
The present investigation included two experiments. In the first experiment, participants completed 
the shopping paradigm, and a subsequent old-new memory test, whilst event-related potentials 
(ERPs) were recorded (Chapter 2). In a second experiment, participants again completed the 
shopping task, followed by a remember-know memory test (Chapter 3). 
In both experiments, a self-reference effect (SRE; Symons & Johnson, 1997) was found, whereby 
participants remembered more items that were assigned to self during the shopping task, than items 
assigned to other. Moreover, in the second experiment, the SRE was found only amongst items that 
were recognised with the addition of episodic detail of the first encounter of the items. These 
findings replicated those of Cunningham and colleagues (Cunningham et al., 2008; van den Bos et al., 
2010) first, in that ownership can trigger self-referential effects in memory, and second, in that the 
self-referential memory advantage assigned to self-owned objects is specific to recollective 
experience. This provides further behavioural evidence for the claim that self-reference enhances 
episodic recollection selectively, and that the self-reference effect can thus be better defined as 
‘self-reference recollection effect’ (SRRE; Conway et al., 2001). The SRRE suggests a close association 
between the self-referential encoding context, and later recollective experience of self-referred 
information during retrieval. It has been argued that a sense of self in the past is necessary for such 
recollective experience to occur (Conway & Dewhurst, 1995). 
In the case of the present enquiry, self-reference was triggered through the assignment of 
temporary, fictitious ownership of objects in a computerised experiment, yet this was still sufficient 
to elicit the effect. This speaks to the extended nature of the self, by which one can consider 
possessions as a self-extension (Belk, 1988). Owned objects have been argued to benefit from a 
special psychological status, such that ownership of an object leads one to evaluate it more 
favourably merely because said object has an association with its owner, and even to perceive it as 
more valuable (Beggan, 1992; Kahneman et al., 1991). The present findings provide more evidence 
that self-item associations elicited implicitly through psychological ownership bring a memory 
advantage comparable to that brought by explicit, evaluative encoding of trait adjectives, albeit a 
smaller one (Cunningham et al., 2008). 
The present enquiry also investigated the neurophysiological correlates of the ownership SRE. A 
P300 effect was found in the first experiment, whereby self-ownership cues yielded a larger P300 
component than other-ownership cues. This indicates that the enhanced attentional processing 




that said enhancement can be triggered online by arbitrary objects that one has no personal history 
with, such as the shopping items used in the present investigation (D. J. Turk, van Busell, Brebner et 
al., 2011). The attentional bias observed might function to enhance subsequent memory for self-
relevant objects (Cunningham et al., 2013). The P300 might be an electrophysiological correlate of 
the self-relevant attentional modulation described by Humphreys and Sui (2016) in their SAN model 
(see 1.3.2). D. J. Turk, van Bussel, Waiter and Macrae’s fMRI study (2011) found that regions 
involved in modulating attention to salient objects are activated during the encoding of self-owned 
stimuli in the shopping task (see also below, 4.1.1). 
Moreover, as the P300 effect was found to persist amongst items that were subsequently 
remembered during the test phase, this also indicates that the attentional bias observed might 
contribute to qualitative memory processes beyond increasing the quantity of recognised objects. As 
further support for this claim, an ownership modulation of the ERP late old-new effect was found, 
whereby correctly recognised self-owned items elicited a late positive component (LPC) larger in 
amplitude, when compared to other-owned items. As the amplitude of the LPC has been found to be 
sensitive to the amount of information retrieved (Vilberg et al., 2006), this finding might indicate 
that, beyond a larger number of recognised items, self-reference in the present paradigm also 
resulted in an enhancement of the quality of memories about said items. Yet, as the first experiment 
did not include a memory test which assessed the amount of information retrieved, there was no 
direct behavioural evidence that participants retrieved more information about self-owned items, 
compared to other-owned items. Furthermore, it was not possible to dissociate the 
neurophysiological correlates of recollection and familiarity-based recognition, as the old-new test 
used did not employ such experimental dissociation. However, in the absence of such overt 
behavioural measure, the ERP data still offers a covert measure indicating a modulation of self-
reference on memory retrieval, which is likely qualitative in nature. 
In the second experiment, the R-K task (Tulving, 1985; Gardiner & Richardson-Klavehn, 2000) was 
used to dissociate between the processes of recollection and familiarity during the test phase of the 
shopping paradigm. One aim of this experiment was to test the validity of such R-K version of the 
paradigm for use in a proposed ERP investigation of self-referential effects on the recollection 
component of memory during retrieval. However, results indicated that such paradigm would not 
produce the required amount of data for a successful ERP analysis (3.3.4). Although ERPs were not 
recorded during this experiment, the finding of a SRRE provided further behavioural evidence that 
self-reference through ownership enhances recollection specifically.  This enhancement might have 




exactly is driving this modulation remains unclear and is a major limitation of the present 
investigation. 
According to dual-process accounts of recognition memory (Yonelinas, 2002), the neural activity 
elicited by correctly recognised items as recorded in the first experiment would have to be the sum 
of the neural correlates of familiarity and recollection. One possible interpretation of the ERP 
findings is that, because a larger number of items owned by self are accompanied by recollection, 
this resulted in a larger LPC component, when compared to items owned by other. This follows that 
the LPC component is found to be larger for items that are recollected, versus those that are 
recognised on the basis of familiarity (Wilding & Ranganath, 2011). Thus, in a comparison of ERP 
waveforms between ownership conditions, without further distinguishing responses according to 
the presence or lack of recollection as measured behaviourally, any difference could be accounted 
for by a greater contribution of the ERP correlates of recollection to the grand-averaged waveform 
for self-owned items, compared to that of other-owned items. 
An alternative explanation for the findings of the present ERP investigation is that, even amongst 
items that are recollected, the ones processed within a self-referential context are characterised by 
a richer recollective experience, with more information retrieved about each item and the episode 
of its initial encoding. In this case, the LPC component would be modulated by ownership even 
amongst responses characterised by recollection, because of its correlation with the amount of 
information retrieved (Vilberg et al., 2006). However, as seen previously, it is difficult to design an 
ERP paradigm that would produce the required number of responses in order to test this hypothesis. 
Despite the above limitations, the present findings indicated that self-reference through ownership 
is characterised by attentional biases at encoding, and that these biases contribute to qualitative 
aspects of memory, in the form of more items recognised with the additional recollection of the 
encoding episode. Potentially, more information is also retrieved about said recollected items, when 
compared to non-self-referred items, although the last claim is speculative and could not be verified 
using the data collected. 
4.1.1 The Present Findings in the Wider Context and Suggestions for Further Research  
The main motivation driving the present inquiry was to investigate self-referential biases on 
attention and memory and their neurophysiological correlates, by using ownership as a means of 
triggering self-reference. ERP-technique provides the ability to measure brain activity in real time 
and can provide some evidence that different networks might be contributing to the differences in 
the neural activity observed; moreover, insight can also be gained from the timing of ERP effects, 




limitation of ERP-technique is that it does not provide a clear indication of the anatomical source of 
the brain activity recorded at the scalp (Luck, 2014). With regards to the brain networks which might 
support the self-referential effects found, specifically, the electrophysiological differences observed 
between ownership conditions in the present data, one can turn to other evidence obtained using 
neuroimaging techniques that provide more spatial accuracy, such as event-related fMRI. The high 
spatial resolution that is characteristic of functional neuroimaging studies means that such evidence 
can be of use in interpreting ERP data, especially when the data is obtained in comparable 
experimental conditions. 
When interpreting results from ERP research one has to acknowledge that, as Rugg and Coles (1995) 
put it, “ERPs provide information about only a fraction [emphasis added] of the neural activity 
associated with the processing of a stimulus” (p.35). As a consequence, the ERP correlate of a 
cognitive process of interest cannot and should not be equated to its neural signature. With this 
caveat in mind, the present ERP enquiry was motivated by a larger theoretical framework 
attempting to describe self-referential processing in its anatomical and functional states, particularly 
when triggered by object ownership (1.4.1). In relating the present findings to such framework, it is 
also important to consider which neural process(es) are directly reflected by the ERP components 
which were the focus of the analyses of present data (specifically, the P300 and the LPC). 
In their fMRI investigation of the shopping paradigm, D. J. Turk and colleagues (2011) identified 
activity in an ‘ownership network’ of brain areas that was predictive of the memory bias. However, 
they did not record fMRI during the test phase, lacking an investigation of which neural networks 
supported the ownership self-referential bias at retrieval. The ownership network includes areas 
known to be recruited for modulation of attention to salient stimuli (dorsomedial prefrontal cortex 
and caudal anterior cingulate cortex), which also overlap with the cortical medial structures (CMS) 
identified by Northoff and colleagues (2006) as key areas for the processing of self-relevant 
information. The finding of a P300 effect during the shopping paradigm indicates that self-owned 
objects benefit from enhanced attention that is triggered online at the moment of encoding. As 
Conway and colleagues (2016) have proposed, this attentional enhancement might be mediated by 
the self-attention network (SAN) identified by Humphreys and Sui (2016), as part of a larger self-
relevance system (SRS) comprising the default mode network as its core. The SRS might function to 
ensure an enhancement of attention towards self-relevant stimuli via the SAN, and the forming of 
memories that are rich and episodic in nature (1.3.2). As the P300 component has been proposed as 
an index of inhibitory neural activity that functions to facilitate memory retention (Polich, 2011), the 
P300 effect seen in the present data might be an index of attentional processes that contribute to 




With regards to the neural generators of the old-new effects, in their review of event-related fMRI 
evidence from a dual-process perspective, Vilberg and Rugg (2008) identified retrieval-related 
activity in inferior parietal cortex as associated with successful recollection. Activity in inferior 
parietal cortex might be driving the self-other differences observed in the LPC, if these differences in 
electrophysiology arose purely because of a higher number of recollected self-owned items, 
compared to other-owned, as explained in the previous section. In this sense, the involvement of 
self-specific neural networks in the brain would not be necessary for eliciting the observed 
differences. An alternative hypothesis is that the modulation of the LPC observed could also be 
elicited by activity in regions supporting both episodic memory processes and self-referential 
cognition. In a more recent review of fMRI findings regarding the functional neuroanatomy of 
successful memory retrieval, Rugg and Vilberg (2013) found further evidence for the proposal that 
specific brain regions, (the hippocampus, parahippocampal cortex, retrosplenial/posterior cingulate 
cortices, lateral parietal cortices, and medial prefrontal cortex) are part of a content-independent 
network which is activated during retrieval accompanied by recollection. They further proposed that 
this “general recollection network” (p. 257) partially overlaps with the default mode network (DMN; 
Buckner et al., 2008), and also with brain regions that activate during the mental construction of 
future-oriented, self-relevant scenarios (Addis, Wong & Schacter, 2007). They argued that these 
overlaps in activity might signify the common engagement of these brain regions in supporting the 
representation and retrieval of episodic information within self-directed cognition. 
In yet another fMRI study, Andrews-Hanna, Reidler, Sepulcre, Poulin and Buckner (2010), proposed 
that the DMN has two major components that meet on a ‘midline core’. According to their data, one 
such component, the ‘medial temporal lobe (MTL) sub-system’, showed increased activity when 
participants imagined future scenarios. This result provides further evidence that the DMN plays a 
major role in both the remembering of the past and imagining of the future (Addis, Wong & 
Schacter, 2007). In contrast, a second component of the DMN, the ‘dorsal-medial prefrontal cortex 
(dMPFC) subsytem’, was found activate when participants considered their current mental states, 
and in particular, it was correlated with self-referential cognitive processes. The midline core, 
comprising the antero-medial prefrontal cortex (aMPFC) and PCC, exhibited self-related activity, 
independently of temporal context, thus showing functional characteristics of both sub-systems. 
These areas have been found to activate during self-referential tasks (D’Argembeau et al., 2005), 
although it is noted that Qin and Northoff (2011) observed that regions of the DMN comprising said 





An investigation of functional neuroanatomy per se was not included in the present enquiry. As ERP-
technique as a means of investigation lacks the spatial precision of functional neuroimaging 
techniques, it does not allow one to draw conclusions about which specific brain regions are 
involved in the process(es) of interest (Rugg & Coles, 1995; Luck, 2014). Despite this limitation, 
observing qualitative differences in the topography between effects can also be taken as evidence 
for the involvement of different neural networks supporting such effects. The self-other differences 
found in the present study during retrieval might be supported by the midline core network, 
identified by Andrews-Hanna and colleagues (2010) as a possible site of convergence for networks 
supporting memory retrieval, and self-referential processing. A future study could use event-related 
fMRI during the retrieval phase of the shopping paradigm to verify whether the ownership self-
reference effect is indeed supported by the network identified by Andrews-Hanna and colleagues 
(2010) as involved in both episodic memory and self-referential cognition. 
4.2 “Out of the Lab”: Potential Applications of the Present Research for the 
Enhancement of Learning 
Beyond gaining a theoretical understanding of how the self-construct impacts on cognition, further 
research could investigate potential applications of self-referential biases on attention and memory 
in real-life scenarios. For instance, the fact that self-referencing is a trigger of mechanisms that 
enhance task engagement such as attention and affective arousal (D. J. Turk, van Bussel, Waiter & 
Macrae, 2011) makes it a potential tool for the enhancement of learning in the classroom. Activation 
of the self-construct might also support further elaboration and organisation of self-referred 
information (Klein & Loftus, 1988). There is evidence that an adult-like SRE develops between the 
ages of 7 and 10 years (Halpin, Puff, Mason & Marston, 1984; Hammen & Zupan, 1984; Pullyblank, 
Bisanz, Scott & Champion, 1985; cited in Cunningham, Vergunst, Macrae and Turk, 2013). D. J. Turk 
and colleagues (D. J. Turk, Gillespie-Smith, Krigolson, Havard, Conway & Cunningham, 2015), tested 
an application of self-referencing in the classroom on 7- to 9-year-olds, wanting to investigate 
whether self-referential encoding could enhance engagement and spelling performance. 
D. J. Turk and colleagues (2015) carried out two experiments in which they used a self-referential 
version of a standard literacy task used in learning of novel words, whereby pupils first copy the 
words to be learned, and then use them in generating a sentence. The first experiment examined 
the impact of self-reference on the learning of nonsensical words, specifically, fictitious alien 
characters (e.g., “Arror”). After copying the words, pupils either included them in a sentence which 
had themselves as a subject (in the self-reference condition), or another alien character named 
“Splay” as subject (in the other-reference condition). D. J. Turk and colleagues (2015) predicted that 




engagement, and perform better in spelling, when compared to pupils in the other-reference 
condition. Examples of generated sentences included, respectively, “Me and Arror like to swim” 
(self-reference), as compared to “Splay and Arror went swimming in the sea and had lots of fun” 
(other-reference). Results showed that self-referencing increased both task engagement and spelling 
performance, as predicted, compared to other-referencing. 
In their second experiment, D. J. Turk and colleagues (2015) investigated the self-referential effect 
on the learning of real vocabulary, to test the application of self-referencing as a teaching tool. 
Contrary to their first experiment, where the other-referent was an unfamiliar alien character, in 
their second experiment the other referent was the well-known fictional character Harry Potter. 
Moreover, this time pupils undertook both the self- and other-referent tasks. Again, pupils were 
asked to copy novel words, and use them in self-generated sentences beginning with either 
themselves (“I…”) or the other-referent (“Harry…”) as a subject. Pupils’ spelling for the learned 
words was then tested individually, four days after. D. J. Turk and colleagues (2015) replicated their 
initial findings of a SRE in spelling, suggesting that the application of self-referencing resulted in an 
enhancement of learning also as applied to real vocabulary. 
D. J. Turk and colleagues (2015) did not find any correlation between sentence length and spelling 
performance, even though sentences generated with self-reference contained more words 
compared to other-reference. This result suggested that the improvement seen in spelling 
performance could not be accounted for solely by an increase in engagement as measured by the 
length of the sentences generated. They argued that other elements of academic engagement which 
were not measured, for instance positive affect, might be better predictors for learning outcome, 
when using self-reference. Nevertheless, their study is an example of how self-referential learning 
manipulations can provide a “high-impact, cost neutral and valuable application of cognitive science 
to education” (D. J. Turk et al., 2015, p.59). 
4.2.1  Application of the LPC as a Marker of Long-Term Learning 
In an educational context, it is difficult to determine, at time of learning, whether particular teaching 
methods are efficient in helping students encode, consolidate and later retrieve knowledge. Wanting 
to search for a biomarker of long-lasting learning that could be useful to determine which teaching 
methods are the most efficient for memory consolidation, K. W. Turk and colleagues (2018) 
investigated subsequent memory performance using ERP-technique, in a real-life learning paradigm. 
Their sample constituted of thirty-four medical students (20-30 years old) enrolled in a 16-week 
introductory anatomy course at Boston University. All learning occurred in the classroom, as 




invited to the lab and presented with anatomical terms from the course at three time points: (1) 
before the course start date (baseline), (2) immediately after the course end date, and (3) six months 
after the course end date. Participants were presented with the anatomical terms and asked to rate 
them using the responses: ‘can define’ (CD), ‘familiar’ (Fam), or ‘don’t know’ (DK). During the second 
session in the lab, ERPs were also recorded whilst participants made these ratings. 
Electrophysiological responses recorded immediately after the course were then separated 
according to subsequent memory performance six months later. 
K. W. Turk and colleagues (2018) found that most terms recollected as definable terms during the 
second session were still recollected six months later (60.5%), or became rated as familiar (34.4%). 
Only 5.1% of terms rated as definable during the second session were completely forgotten, 
indicating that recollection, as measured behaviourally immediately after the course, was a strong 
predictor of long-term retention. Most interestingly, their ERP results revealed that the LPC 
component was a predictor for the long-term recollection of the anatomical terms. Specifically, a 
larger LPC amplitude occurring 700-1000ms post-stimulus over the left parietal scalp was seen for 
stimuli that were subsequently recollected 6 months later (CD), compared to those stimuli 
recognised as familiar (Fam), and those that were forgotten (DK). Moreover, the FN400 component 
distinguished between later Fam versus DK responses, as well as CD versus DK responses, but not CD 
versus Fam responses. 
K. W. Turk and colleagues (2018) concluded from their findings that the LPC alone predicted later 
recollection, as a potential marker of high-quality, long-lasting learning, whereas the FN400 acted as 
a marker for general familiarity. Their behavioural findings also indicated that recollection responses 
alone held predictive power about the likelihood of long-term retention of the terms. Their study 
provided new knowledge about the LPC as a marker of real-life, course-based learning, which 
predicted memorial strength several months after the initial learning of the course material. These 
findings have relevance for educational curriculum development, as the effectiveness of teaching 
methods could be tested even at the end of a particular lesson, using LPC as a predictor of long-term 
retention of taught material. 
The LPC effect found by K. W. Turk and colleagues (2018) is similar to that found in the present 
enquiry; however, the learning of course material by the college students who participated in their 
study likely involved intentional elaboration and organisation of the material for its subsequent 
retention, probably well-motivated by wanting to succeed on the anatomy course. On the contrary, 
in the present enquiry, participants were not learning with the awareness their memory for the 




credits would be granted independently of their performance on the tasks. Despite this, the self-
referential memory enhancement still occurred, although its long-term impact was not measured. 
The findings of K. W. Turk and colleagues (2018) provide new ideas for ways in which the 
effectiveness of the application of self-reference to the enhancement of learning could be tested by 
using ERP-technique. If the LPC is indeed a predictor of long-term retention, then applications of 
self-reference in the classroom, such as the one described in the previous section, could be tested 
for effectiveness shortly after the self-referential learning has occurred. It is acknowledged that 
testing school pupils in the EEG-lab can prove quite difficult for logistical reasons. Yet, new low-cost, 
portable EEG equipment has been flourishing in recent years, allowing researchers to bring their 
research “out of the lab”, in more realistic settings. For instance, Krigolson and colleagues (Krigolson, 
Williams, Norton, Hassall & Colino, 2017) validated the use of the portable EEG equipment ‘MUSE’ 
(InterAxon Inc.), for carrying out ERP research. They have since then been using MUSE to gather ERP 
data in a number of settings, including reinforcement-learning (e.g., Walsh et al., 2019). Given the 
potential for self-reference to be applied as a learning enhancement technique, further research 
could test the viability of its application in the classroom, as well as other learning settings, through 
the use of the LPC as a marker of long-term retention of self-referred material. 
 
4.3 Final conclusion 
In conclusion, the present enquiry added to existing evidence that the self has an impact on the 
cognitive processes of attention and memory. Specifically, using ownership as a means of triggering 
self-referential encoding, an attentional bias toward self-referred items was found, which was 
argued to facilitate elaborative encoding of said items, resulting in retrieval accompanied by 
recollective experience. Future research could investigate whether self-specific brain structures 
support the retrieval of self-owned items in the shopping paradigm, for a thorough account of where 
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1 0.51 0.29 0.41 0.81 0.50 
Note. Responses for participants number 3, 4, and 5 were absent; participants number 8 and 22 were excluded 
from the analysis due to artefact rejection. CRs = Correct Rejections; FAs = False Alarms; NR = No Response;    
d’ = sensitivity index scores. 
a Participants with a d’ score of less than 1 were excluded from the analysis (n = 7). b Participants whose 
responses were missing only for the encoding task (n = 2) were included in the analysis of ERP data at 
encoding, and both behavioural and ERP data at test, on the basis of their good test performance, as measured 







Written R-K task instructions for Experiment 2 adapted from Gardiner & Richardson-Klavehn (2000). 
 
In this test you will see a series of pictures of items, one item at a time. Some of the items are those 
that you’ve seen in the shopping task. Others are not. You will be asked to recognise the items that 
you have seen already.  
Recognition memory is associated with two different kinds of awareness. Quite often recognition 
brings back to mind something you recollect about what it is that you recognise, as when, for 
example, you recognise someone’s face, and perhaps remember talking to this person at a party the 
previous night. At other times recognition brings nothing back to mind about what it is you 
recognise, as when, for example, you are confident that you recognise someone, and you know you 
recognise them, because of strong feelings or familiarity, but you have no recollection of seeing this 
person before. You do not remember anything about them. 
The same kinds of awareness are associated with recognising the items you’ve seen in the previous 
task. Sometimes when you recognise an item as one you’ve seen already, recognition will bring back 
to mind something you remember thinking about when the item appeared then. You recollect 
something you consciously experienced at that time. But sometimes recognising an item as one 
you’ve seen during the sorting task will not bring back to mind anything you remember about seeing 
it then. Instead, the item will seem familiar, so that you feel confident it was one you’ve already 
seen, even though you don’t recollect anything you experienced when you saw it then. 
For each item, click the YES button if you recognise the item as one you’ve seen in the previous task, 
and click the NO button if you do not think the item was one you’ve seen already. 
For each item that you recognise, after you have clicked the YES button, please then click the 
REMEMBER button, if recognition is accompanied by some recollective experience, or the KNOW 
button, if recognition is accompanied by strong feelings of familiarity in the absence of any 
recollective experience. 
There might also be times when, after clicking the YES button, you realise you did not remember the 
item, nor did it seem familiar. If your YES response is really just a guess, please then click the GUESS 
button. 
The experimenter will now ask you to explain to them, in your own words, what the difference 











 Appendix C.  
Number of responses for the memory test in Experiment 2. 
Participant SH SR SK SG SM OH OR OK OG OM CR FA NR NK NG 
 1a 32 18 10 4 63 27 17 6 3 68 84 11 3 6 2 
2 87 76 8 3 8 64 6 57 1 31 83 12 1 2 9 
3 67 39 28 0 28 42 16 26 0 53 92 3 0 3 0 
4 82 44 38 0 13 69 36 33 0 26 88 7 0 7 0 
5 79 69 9 1 16 69 52 15 2 26 64 31 13 17 1 
 6a 21 5 16 0 74 23 7 15 0 72 84 11 0 10 1 
7 47 28 19 0 48 50 32 17 1 45 88 7 0 7 0 
8 70 25 45 0 25 49 8 41 0 46 91 4 0 4 0 
9 25 18 3 4 70 31 20 6 5 64 88 7 5 1 1 
10 42 23 19 0 53 42 21 21 0 53 61 34 14 19 1 
11 32 18 3 10 63 29 15 8 6 66 83 12 6 3 3 
12 48 32 16 0 47 46 26 20 0 49 78 17 4 13 0 
 13a 15 7 8 0 80 20 13 7 0 75 87 8 6 2 0 
14 38 30 2 4 57 43 28 4 11 52 89 6 1 1 4 
  15b 57 — — — 38 50 — — — 45 91 4 — — — 
16 32 15 17 0 63 38 18 20 0 57 89 6 6 0 0 
17 40 17 14 9 55 34 15 14 4 61 74 21 13 1 7 
 18b 62 — — — 33 64 — — — 28 71 24 — — — 
 19c — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 
 20c — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 
21 41 28 8 5 54 51 38 10 3 44 70 25 20 3 2 
 22a 84 45 27 12 11 82 32 30 20 13 30 65 3 23 38 
23 81 70 11 0 14 56 36 13 7 39 89 6 0 5 1 
24 68 59 9 0 27 69 55 14 0 26 92 3 0 3 0 
25 66 45 19 2 29 69 42 21 6 26 80 15 1 8 6 
 26a 21 8 10 1 74 21 5 15 0 73 91 4 2 2 0 
 27b 49 — — — 46 50 — — — 45 93 2 — — — 
28 34 20 14 0 61 34 16 18 0 61 87 8 1 7 0 
 29b 71 — — — 24 68 — — — 27 86 8 — — — 
 30a 20 15 2 1 75 21 9 8 4 74 88 7 6 0 1 
31 73 54 18 1 22 54 19 35 0 41 94 1 1 0 0 
32 62 28 34 0 33 47 13 33 0 48 75 19 0 19 0 
 33a 22 13 6 3 73 25 19 4 2 70 86 9 6 2 1 
34 72 34 28 10 23 65 40 13 12 30 92 3 1 0 2 
35 46 28 17 0 49 42 22 19 1 53 59 36 9 26 0 
36 56 27 22 7 39 43 25 13 5 52 82 13 2 8 3 
 37c — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 
38 50 22 27 1 45 45 16 27 2 50 71 24 5 18 1 
39 63 44 18 1 32 51 30 19 2 44 74 21 6 15 0 
40 35 12 23 0 60 24 12 12 0 71 86 9 2 7 0 
 41a 38 8 30 0 57 43 8 35 0 52 62 33 9 23 1 




43 75 61 11 3 20 68 58 9 1 27 87 8 2 4 2 
44 55 37 12 6 40 72 56 12 4 23 68 27 4 19 4 
45 60 24 30 6 35 58 20 31 7 37 91 4 0 1 3 
46 62 37 24 1 33 59 34 25 0 36 91 4 0 4 0 
47 43 36 5 2 52 56 48 5 3 39 76 19 12 2 5 
 48a 18 6 9 3 77 12 7 5 0 83 82 13 2 9 2 
49 43 22 20 1 52 48 24 23 1 47 75 20 0 20 0 
50 56 21 34 1 39 60 26 34 0 35 62 33 2 31 0 
51 57 33 18 6 38 52 29 18 5 43 67 28 23 1 4 
52 38 19 18 1 57 42 16 22 4 53 84 11 1 6 4 
 
Note. S= Self; O=Other; N=New; H=Hit; M=Miss; R=Remember; K=Know; G=Guess; CR = Correct Rejection; FA = 
False Alarm. 
 
aParticipant excluded from the memory analysis during data processing. bParticipant excluded from the 
memory awareness analysis only due to recording failure resulting in lack of data. cParticipant did not 
complete the experiment and was not included in any analysis. 
 
 
 
